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Every modern public corporation has obligations of accounta-
bility and disclosure to the public and to its shareholders. These
accepted duties of disclosure, however, become the source of con-
flicts when government agencies make unanticipated inquiries of
accountants about otherwise private or background data concern-
ing the corporations they audit. This is particularly true when a
public corporation's duties of financial accountability, which stem
chiefly from securities law requirements and fiduciary duties,
evoke the Internal Revenue Service's interest in information that
may reveal or be probative of the corporation's tax liability. Most
corporate taxpayers and their accountants understand and ac-
cept-if only reluctantly-their obligations to provide the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS or Service) with relevant documents gener-
ated during everyday business activity. More recently, however,
the complexity of financial accountability requirements has
prompted some corporations to ask their independent accountants
to prepare a set of "sensitive"1 papers for the audit of the corpora-
* Trial Attorney, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice. B.A., 1970, Yale
College; J.D., 1974, University of Pennsylvania; M.L.T., 1980, Georgetown University. The
author has been the government's trial counsel in two of the cases discussed herein. The
views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the official position of the Internal Revenue Service or the Department of Justice.
1. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the American
Bar Association implicitly acknowledged the extent of this sensitivity when they formed
advisory committees on the topics discussed in this Article to organize the resistance to the
Government's attempts at obtaining these papers by summons. Moreover, at least one court
has found the topic to be too controversial to decide on the facts presented. United States v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as
moot, 623 F.2d 720 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to second party,
623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980). In the initial appeal to the First Circuit, the court dismissed
the case as moot, since the workpapers had been produced. The case went to the court of
appeals again, however, because the summons also called for testimony, which of course had
not been "produced." The court stated,
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tion's financial statements. These papers, which the accountants
and their client corporations originally did not intend for revenue
agents to examine, have attracted the Service's interest because of
their potential impact on the corporation's tax liability.
A legal controversy has been emerging recently in a few re-
ported cases over the Service's efforts to obtain by summons2 ac-
countants' "sensitive" papers. These documents include audit
workplans, reports to management (dealing with internal account-
ing and management controls), and tax reserve papers (dealing
with the corporate balance sheet's accrued reserve for contingent
tax liabilities). The controversy concerns a small but influential
group of clients-the very large public corporations-and the "Big
Eight" of the accounting profession.8 After examining the back-
The importance of the interests of all concerned-taxpayers, accountants, and
IRS-is clear. That a resolution sensitively reflecting the legitimate interests of all and
faithful to applicable statutes would involve the most delicate and demanding analysis
of facts, research and law, and reflection on policy is equally clear. Precisely because we
view the issue of "relevance" as so significant, we find this case in a poor posture to
serve as the matrix for a precedent ...
We therefore hold. . . that because of the production of the records to which any
questioning would relate, any decision regarding the possible relevance of such ques-
tioning under 26 U.S.C. § 7602 would be premature.
623 F.2d at 729-30.
2. The summons power is codified in I.R.C. § 7602, which deals with the examination
of books and witnesses and provides as follows:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal
revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any
person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secre-
tary is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant
or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care
of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for
tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary may deem
proper, to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in the summons
and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony,
under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be rele-
vant or material to such inquiry.
3. The eight major accounting firms are as follows: Arthur Andersen & Co.; Arthur
Young & Co.; Coopers & Lybrand; Deloitte, Haskins & Sells; Ernst & Whinney; Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co.; Price Waterhouse & Co.; and Touche Ross & Co. Each of the
litigated cases in this field has involved at least one of these firms or a client thereof. Gener-
ally, however, the accountants have been the only ones who have evinced a truly adversarial
attitude. In United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), af'd,
550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977), for example, the taxpayer, Johns-Manville Corp., was not a
party and did not seek to intervene. Accord, United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515
1562
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ground of this controversy in more detail, this Article explores the
IRS' efforts to resolve the dispute in its favor, the availability of
the summons power to obtain sensitive accountant workpapers, the
public policy controversy generated by the Service's efforts, and
the course that the debate is likely to take on these issues in the
future.4
II. BACKGROUND
When a corporation goes public, the law subjects it to a series
of reporting and disclosure requirements in fulfillment of new obli-
gations to its shareholders and the public. Many federal and state
statutes and regulations that govern corporate existence in general,
and public corporations in particular, require the engagement of
independent accountants to perform annual audits of the corpora-
tion's books, records, and financial statements. Most prominent
among these duties are securities law reporting requirements
(Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) regu-
lations) and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, which de-
limit the scope and depth of the accountants' audit. The Commis-
sion's Regulation S-X 5 specifies the uniform accounting rules for
certain financial statements required to be filed under the Securi-
F. Supp. 996 (N.D. IlM. 1981) (mem.). Compare United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F.
Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) and United States v. Riley Co., 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1164 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (mem.), appeal dismissed, No. 80-1124 (7th Cir. Sept. 16, 1980) and United States v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as
moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to second party,
623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980) with United States v. First Chicago Corp., 43 A.F.T.R.2d 79-704
(N.D. Ill. 1978) (mem.) and United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 923 (1979).
4. A public corporation's engagement of independent accountants to fulfill auditing
requirements often will generate tension between the reporting and disclosure obligations
and the accountants' desire to keep secret the "private" papers that they prepare for their
client. Furthermore, the Service's efforts to compel production of the engagement's results
exacerbate this conflict, which is in part a result of the accountant's dual role as private
counselor and public overseer. It is understandable, therefore, that the accounting profes-
sion would take such a keen interest in the outcome.
In United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. InI. 1981) (mem.)
Price Waterhouse responded to the Government's petition in part by filing eight affidavits,
one each from the "Big Eight" accounting firms. These affidavits were aimed at convincing
the court that the accountants' auditing standards would suffer if the court compelled pro-
duction of the tax reserve memorandum that was summoned by the IRS. Id. at 1000 n.6.
Significantly, the client-taxpayer did not ever seek to intervene and expressed no reluctance
to have the IRS obtain a copy of the memorandum from Price Waterhouse, which was the
Service's only source.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1980).
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ties Act of 1933,8 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,7 and the
Investment Company Act of 1940.' Rule 3-16(o)9 of the regulation
requires disclosure in a corporation's income statement-or a note
to itl°-of the components of income tax expense, including taxes
currently payable. The rule further provides that the corporation
must detail the net effects of timing differences for items such as
depreciation, warranty costs, operating losses, and net deferred in-
vestment tax credits. The financial statement or a note to it also
must contain a provision concerning foreign taxes, in addition to a
disclosure of the reasons for and amount of any cash outlay for
income taxes due in succeeding years, if they will substantially ex-
ceed the current year's taxes. Finally, the rule requires a reconcilia-
tion of the reported tax expense with pretax income mutiplied by
the applicable tax rate, and an explanation of any differences be-
tween the two figures.11
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-77e, 77j, 77k, 77m, 77o, 77s, 78a-78o, 78o-3, 78p-78hh (1976).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1976).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-16(o) (1980).
10. The following are examples of financial statement notes:
XEROX CORPORATION (DEC)
NOTES TO CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Subsequent Event-On February 12, 1979, the Company received an Internal Revenue
Service notice proposing additional tax liability of $88 million for the years 1972 and
1973 which will be vigorously contested by the Company. The proposed adjustments
relate principally to the timing of depreciation deductions for tax purposes. The IRS is
proposing a longer life for the Company's copying and duplicating equipment than cur-
rently used for both tax and financial reporting purposes; however, this will not affect
the way the Company currently depreciates copying and duplicating equipment in its
financial statements. In the opinion of the Company, the final outcome will have no
material impact on results of operations.
CMI CORPORATION (DEC)
NOTES TO CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Note 9 (in part): Commitments and Contingent Liabilities-
The Internal Revenue Service has completed its examination of the Company's
income tax returns for the years 1972 through 1975 and advised the Company that
additional income taxes of approximately $2,300,000 were due for those years, a major
portion of which results from timing differences. The Company has contested the as-
serted deficiencies and has petitioned for a redetermination of the deficiencies before
the United States Tax Court. In the opinion of management, the final additional tax
will be substantially less than the amounts proposed. The Company believes that it has
made adequate provision for final settlement of the proposed adjustments.
AMERICAN INsTrrTUTE OF CRTIFmED PUBLIc AccouNTANTs, AcCOUNTING TRENDS AND TECH-
NIQUES, 78, 113 (33d ed. 1979).
11. The Commission considered, but did not adopt, a more far-reaching amendment.
See Keeshan & Craco, Securities Law Considerations in the Auditor's Tax Accrual Review,
1564
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The accounting profession's standard for the disclosure of ma-
terial contingent items is contained in Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board (FASB) No. 5, entitled "Accounting for Contingen-
cies."12 FASB No. 5 applies to several of the possible components
of a corporation's reserve for contingent taxes, including timing
differences,13 permanent differences, 1 4 and other potential adjust-
ments, all of which require judgments of inclusion or exclusion on
the part of the accountant. Under this standard, any loss must be
accrued by a charge to income if information available prior to the
issuance of the financial statement indicates it is "probable1 5 that
an asset has been impaired or a liability incurred as of the date of
the financial statement, and that the amount can be reasonably
estimated. If accrual is not appropriate, then the contingency must
be disclosed if a loss is at least a "reasonable possibility."" The
disclosure must reveal the nature of the contingency and estimate
the range of the potential 108S.17 If a particular contingent item is
of borderline materiality, the doctrine of conservative accounting18
may require accrual or disclosure to avoid a potential liability for
in IRS ACCESS TO AccouNTANTs' WORKPAPERS 15-18 (N.Y.L.J. Law Journal Seminars-Press
1980). The authors state that the proposed rule would have required reporting companies to
reconcile the following two sets of figures: (a) Pretax income and income tax expense, both
federal and foreign, and (b) taxable income and related income taxes that are anticipated to
be reported on federal and foreign returns. This proposal might have required disclosure of
tax accrual workpapers. See Securities Act Release No. 6178, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. Szc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,424 (Jan. 15, 1980). The proposal, however, was strongly op-
posed and withdrawn. Securities Act Release No. 6233, 6 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 72,302
(Sept. 2, 1980).
12. FASB STATEMENT No. 5.
13. See notes 38-42 infra and accompanying text.
14. See id.
15. "Probable" is defined as follows: "The future event or events are likely to occur."
FASB STATEMENT No. 5, 3(a).
16. "Reasonably possible" is defined as follows: "The chance of the future event or
events occurring is more than remote but less than likely." Id. I 3(b).
17. No disclosure is required, however, when a potential claimant has manifested no
awareness of a claim "unless it is considered probable that the claim will be asserted and
there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome will be unfavorable." Id. I 10.
18. Although the doctrine of conservative accounting has sometimes been oversimpli-
fied, in that it is said to require an overstatement of liabilities and an understatement of
assets and net income, it is actually two principles intended to guide accountants' best esti-
mates of a firm's actual financial situation. First, the doctrine forbids the anticipation of
sales, revenues, or income. Recognition is permitted only on the consummation of sale and
delivery. Second, estimates of all liabilities and losses, if known to have been incurred,
should be recorded despite a lack of certainty about the exact amount. These principles
reinforce the accountant's independent attempt to provide the most reasonable and accu-
rate reflection of "potential losses in the realization of recorded assets and in the settlement
of actual and contingent liabilities." R. WIXON, W. KELL & N. BEDFORD, AccouNTATrs
HANDBOOK 1-22 (5th ed. 1970).
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the accountants.
Under these guidelines and standards, the accountant must
decide whether the contingent tax reserve and other accounts on
the financial statement are reasonable and correct, as well as
whether any error is sufficiently material 9 to require disclosure. To
make these decisions, the accountants must evaluate the reasona-
bleness and materiality of the tax reserve and other accounts from
both an individual and collective viewpoint. The accountant then
may be in a position to render the required formal opinion on the
statement's adherence to Generally Accepted Accounting Princi-
ples (GAAP).
In addition to the public reporting that is required of the cor-
poration, the accountants themselves are subject to personal liabil-
ities, the range and frequency of which have been steadily increas-
ing.20 These liabilities can extend to criminal charges as well as
civil actions for damages."' The threat of such sanctions creates a
self-preservation motive that induces accountants to make thor-
ough audits of their corporate clients. To fulfill all of their duties
during and after the audit, accountants create at least three dis-
tinct sets of papers that are the subject of the emerging contro-
19. See Keeshan & Craco, supra note 11, at 22-24 (defining materiality).
20. See, e.g., Gormley, Accountants' Professional Liability-A Ten-Year Review, 29
Bus. LAw. 1205 (1974); Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third Par-
ties, 52 NoTRE DAME LAW. 838 (1977).
21. Under LR.C. § 7206(2) it is a felony to assist willfully in the preparation of a false
or fraudulent return. See, e.g., United States v. Egenberg, 441 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971); Newton v. United States, 162 F.2d 795 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. de-
nied, 333 U.S. 848 (1948) (false or excessive deductions). See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.
Fed. 128 (1979). Accountants are also liable for ordinary negligence or fraud. See Annot., 46
A.L.R.3d 979 (1972). Moreover, they may be subject to censure or suspension from practice
before the SEC for failure to follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP),
Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979), and, under certain circumstances,
may share the liability of their principals for rule 10b-5 violations. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The
profession is also highly regulated by state law, and improprieties can result in the ultimate
sanction of loss of license. See Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 433 (1960) (collecting law and cases from
twenty-one jurisdictions that regulate the accountancy profession). See generally Gormley,
supra note 20; Mess, supra note 20. Finally, Treasury Department Circular No. 230, 31
C.F.R. § 10 (1980), is a comprehensive document that sets forth the Service's rules on who
may practice before it, ethical duties required of enrolled agents, and the disciplinary pro-
ceedings for violation of its provisions. The authority to practice before the IRS is the bread
and butter of many accountants, particularly members of the larger firms such as the "Big
Eight." The Circular imposes general duties of disclosure, id. § 10.20, the duty to disclose
errors or omissions, id. § 10.21, and a duty of diligence in ensuring the accuracy of a return.




versy: (1) The audit workplan,22 (2) reports to management, 3 and
(3) tax reserve files and memoranda. The last of these are also
sometimes termed tax pool analysis files, 2 4 tax accrual workpapers
and reports,25 and tax contingency reserves or analyses. 26 A clear
understanding of the contents of these papers is essential to any
discussion of the legal issues that they have generated.
A. The Audit Workplan
The audit workplan is a "detailed master plan prepared by
[the accounting firm] for and prior to its examination" of the cli-
ent's financial statements. The program consists of (1) a listing of
procedures that the accountants intend to follow in examining the
books and records, (2) records confirming that those procedures
were followed, and (3) suggestions for future modification of the
procedures.28 The workplan is "the statement of the independent
auditor's plan and program for the conduct of the audit. . . , the
auditor's methodology, the guidelines as to which areas and which
records of the client will and will not be examined."2 9 The audit
workplan tells the auditor, among other things, which of thousands
of accounts to check, how thorough the test check should be, and
whether and to what extent backup data, documents, or even cli-
ent interviews should be secured. In other words, it is the account-
ant's "game plan."
22. See United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), afl'd,
550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
23. See United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923
(1979); United States v. Riley Co., 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1164 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (mere.), appeal
dismissed, No. 80-1124 (7th Cir. Sept. 16, 1980); United States v. First Chicago Corp., 43
A.F.T.R.2d 79-704 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (mem.).
24. See United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), afl'd,
550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996
(N.D. IM. 1981) (meri.).
25. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal of one
party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as
to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980).
26. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 483 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Minn.), stay
granted, 483 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Minn. 1979).
27. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 945 (D. Colo. 1975), affd,
550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
28. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
29. Id. at 1157.
15671981]
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B. Reports to Management and Internal Audit Reports
The accountants prepare reports to management at the end of
each audit. These reports evaluate whether the corporation's ac-
counting systems, procedures, and controls are adequate and accu-
rate.30 For example, the corporation's accounts receivable depart-
ment may have the authority to charge off debts without checking
with the credit department. A report to management might expose
this problem and suggest ways in which the corporation could im-
prove its accounting system for bad debts. An inventories report to
management might recite that the physical inventory is carelessly
taken, that test counts are inaccurate, or that no documented pro-
cedure exists for an accurate physical count of inventory items.31
Similarly, the report to management would provide possible meth-
ods to correct these weaknesses.
C. Tax Reserve Papers and Memoranda
The tax reserve papers 2 are by far the most controversial of
the sensitive papers now being sought by the IRS through sum-
monses. These papers typically contain a summary analysis of cer-
tain selected transactions, recorded in the corporation's general
ledger, concerning the special reserve for contingent income taxes.
The documents also usually include a computation of the tax pro-
vision and a memorandum discussing those items of income or ex-
pense for which the ultimate tax treatment is uncertain.3 3
30. These reports, called internal audit reports if done by company personnel, summa-
rize the work done in normal accounting workpapers. The Internal Revenue Audit Manual
defines audit workpapers to include
workpapers retained by the independent accountant as to the procedures followed, the
tests performed, the information obtained, and the conclusions reached pertinent to
his/her examination. Workpapers may include work programs, analyses, memoran-
dums, letters of confirmation and representation, abstracts of company documents, and
schedules or commentaries prepared or obtained by the auditor. These workpapers
provide an important support for the independent certified public accountant's opinion
as to the fairness of the presentation of the financial statements, in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles and demonstrate compliance with the gener-
ally accepted auditing standards.
I INTERNAL REVENUE MAuAL-AuDrr (CCH) § 4024.2(2) (May 14, 1981) (citations omitted).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Riley Co., 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1164 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(mem.), appeal dismissed, No. 80-1124 (7th Cir. Sept. 16, 1980).
32. Although this set of papers is known by a variety of terms-tax provision memo-
randa, tax accrual workpapers, tax contingency files, tax reserve memoranda, and tax pool
analyses; see cases cited notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text-the shorthand "tax re-
serve" papers, files, or memoranda will be used for convenience in this discussion.
33. Compare United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 327 n.6 (D.
Mass. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
[Vol. 34:1561
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Reports to management and tax reserve files share some of the
accountants' subjective judgments based on their experience, se-
lected testing, and even client interviews. The accountants ordina-
rily do not prepare either set of files for the corporation's federal
income tax return, but provide them to promote managerial effi-
ciency and to justify the tax reserves. The two classes of papers
differ in that the tax reserve files focus directly and exclusively on
items having potential tax consequences. They also may contain
more speculation and conjecture on legal and accounting theories
than would reports to management.
The tax reserve, for example, may include an accrual for ques-
tionable inventory writedowns. The tax reserve files and memoran-
dum would evaluate the accuracy of this reserve, the consequences
of the differing legal and accounting theories that may affect the
reserve's treatment, the best and worst outcomes for the corpora-
tion, and the effect of the disallowance of all or part of the reserve
as a deduction. As the court stated in United States v. Coopers &
Lybrand,3 4 "Inherent in the .. .analysis is the clear recognition
. .. that the tax treatment and projections . . .may be inter-
preted differently by the IRS. ' '35 Thus, the tax reserve file is likely
to bring together most of the corporation's potential tax vulner-
abilities and contain the thoughts, experiences, evaluations, and
even educated speculations of the accountants. Indeed, one com-
mentator-a former Commissioner of Internal Revenue-has
labelled it as the "definitive roadmap to the soft spots in a tax
return.
'3 6
The tax reserve fie has four components of varying degrees of
449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980), with United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152, 1153 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The Internal
Revenue Audit Manual defines tax reconciliation workpapers to include "workpapers used
in assembling and compiling financial data preparatory to placing it on a tax return....
They include information used to trace financial information to the tax return." I INMRNAL
REVENUE MANuAL-AUDrr (CCH) § 4024.2(1) (May 14, 1981). Section 4024.2(3)(a) of the
Manual incorporates the definition in footnote six of the district court opinion in Arthur
Andersen into its definition of tax accrual workpapers.
34. 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
35. Id. at 945. Other examples of items that could appear in tax reserve memoranda
are financial history; comparison of book and taxable income; prominent sales, gains, losses,
and tax consequences; inventory and its aging controls; timing of recognition of sales of
property (installment basis, capital or ordinary gain or loss); pension plans, stock options,
deferred compensation, customer debts. The file would reflect how these items are ac-
counted for, their tax consequences, and possibly even the chances of an audit.
36. Caplin, Should the Service Be Permitted To Reach Accountants' Tax Accrual
Workpapers?, 51 J. TAx. 194, 194 (1979).
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"sensitivity. 87 The first and least controversial component is an
analysis of actual but unpaid tax accruals in filed or soon to be
filed returns. To prepare this analysis, the accountant mechanical-
ly computes or checks the reserve for unpaid, accrued, present, or
future liabilities that are actually reported. In the second and third
components, the accountant evaluates the reserve for timing differ-
ences and permanent differences in tax treatment of the various
reserve items. Timing differences arise when revenues or expenses
are recognized in one period for financial reporting purposes and in
another for tax purposes. Examples of these differences are install-
ment sales and advance rents or royalties.8 The accountant in
these transactions typically must ask the following questions: (1)
Has a sufficient reserve been accrued for warranty claims, and, if
so, for which taxable years?39 (2) What factors and judgments went
into the accrual? (3) What is the reserve for installment sales,
which may be recognized for tax purposes in years after the year of
actual sale? 40 Permanent differences, on the other hand, are tax
items that have a permanent-as opposed to a deferred-effect.
Examples of permanent differences are like-kind exchanges,41 capi-
tal or ordinary treatment for gains,4 '2 tax-exempt income, and per-
centage depletion. The alleged sensitivity of the papers containing
these two types of components stems from the accountant's famili-
arity not only with the nature and amount of the transaction, but
also with the various legal and accounting theories that could af-
fect that transaction's tax treatment.
The last component, which has the potential for the greatest
controversy, is the accountant's analysis of the reserve for any
other undisclosed potential adjustments. This component includes
the identification of issues-whether or not reported, accounted
for, or material-which the accountant believes, in light of his ex-
perience, that the IRS may raise on audit. These items, apparently
bounded only by the breadth of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
(Code) and the imagination of lawyers and accountants, include
matters such as the Service's potential reallocation of income, the
37. See generally Cohen, Tax Aspects of Accountant's Tax Accrual Workpapers, in
IRS AcCESS TO AccouNTrNrs' WORKPAPERs 35-55 (N.Y.L.J. Law Journal Seminars-Press
1980).
38. Id. See also APB OPINION No. 11, 15; 3 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARD (CCH)
§§ 4091.12, .14.
39. See 3 AICPA-PRFESSIONAL STANDARD (CCH) § 4091.14.
40. Id.
41. See id. § 4091.32; I.R.C. §§ 1245(b)(4), 1250(d)(4).
42. See generally I.R.C. § 1222; see also I.R.C. §§ 1201, 1253.
1570 [Vol. 34:1561
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tax effects of pension plans, deferred compensation, and the like.
The accountant often must question the client closely to discover
these and other potential areas of adjustment. He must examine
the return and related workpapers, discuss the facts, and evaluate
potential theories of liability, the likelihood of discovery by the
IRS, the potential tax consequences of this discovery, and the
chances of success if an item is contested. The report, for example,
might include the "worst case" scenarios that are mentioned in
some of the litigation in this field.43 In addition, the accountants
often evaluate, among other things, the following issues: Whether
the IRS may detect an arbitrary deduction, the corporation's expo-
sure if it does, and what the taxpayer's position should be;
whether, in an acquisition or sale, the parties have valued the as-
sets properly, and the tax exposure if they have not; and whether
inventory writedowns are arbitrary, and, if so, why and what the
corporation's potential exposure might be. Thus, the accountant
must ask questions in every area in which the complexities of tax
law and accounting procedures expose the corporation to potential
additional liability. In these situations the accountant's indepen-
dence and conservatism often conflict with the client's desire to
maximize the report of earnings. The accountant, however, must
ask the questions and record the results; otherwise, he may be un-
able to conclude whether the tax reserve is adequate. One tax
reserve memorandum, for example, contained the following
statement:
* * *[c]onsideration was being given by the audit staff to writing off in 1975
approximately $500,000, [in advertising receivables] of which $200,000 related
to 1974 and $300,000 to 1975, although the client is confident that these
amounts will be collected. A revenue agent could assert that a write-off is
inappropriate and that the income and related receivable should not have
been recorded in the earlier year. To the extent that any write-offs relate to
receivables accrued in years closed by the statute of limitations, a disallow-
ance in 1975 would have a permanent effect. In addition, this advertising in-
come was included in the computation of the patronage refund in the year in
which it was recorded. Accordingly, to the extent that income was recorded in
years for which the statute of limitations is still open, a permanent difference
may result since a portion of the patronage refund for that year would not be
deductible for tax purposes.
[Taxpayer's] position on audit would be that the receivable represented
their best estimate at the time and that any uncollectible portion is a current
bad debt. The issue may not arise since [taxpayer's] method of writing off the
receivable (i.e., by crediting to the receivable amounts which actually re-
43. See, e.g., United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975),
afl'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
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present current income) will be somewhat difficult to detect.4
The depth of the accountant's inquiry, the give-and-take of
client-accountant discussions, the continual testing and checking,
and the critical perspective that these probes require, result in vo-
luminous documents which reveal the financial and tax workings of
the corporation. The IRS has been seeking precisely these types of
data-if only infrequently.45 These attempts at examination of
documents are understandable when one considers their probative
value. It is equally understandable, however, that the accountants,
as well as occasionally their clients, are loathe to disclose them.
The accountants in particular have expressed concern over this is-
sue, since they typically have highlighted the questionable areas of
the taxpayer's return and, unlike lawyers, cannot rely on a client
privilege."
Thus, the IRS has sought enforcement of summonses for "sen-
sitive" accounting papers, and the accountants have resisted these
efforts. Any successful resistance to compulsory process obviously
must take the form of recognized defenses to the summons power.
These defenses provide the framework of the accountants' opposi-
tion to summonses for tax reserve papers, reports to management,
and audit workplans. They have developed in the case law and can
be articulated as follows: (1) The data either are not relevant to
the Service's investigation or are a mere convenience; (2) public
policy considerations dictate that the data should be kept confi-
dential; and (3) the papers are not "other data," which are subject
to summons under section 7602 of the Code.47 Part III of this Arti-
cle explores the rationales underlying the accountants' defenses
and concludes that the courts should find them unpersuasive.
44. Government's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Exhibit I, at
9-10, United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996 (S.D. IM. 1981) (mem.).
45. The courts have decided fewer than ten reported cases in this field over the past
six years. Moreover, the Service's own manual further restricts the extent to which, and the
circumstances under which, agents should seek tax reserve papers. See note 49 infra.
46. Compare Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981) with Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) and United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) and United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass.
1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1021 (1980), aff'd as to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980). See also notes 104-15
infra and accompanying text. The protection of attorneys' material is derived from the work
product doctrine enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), as well as from the
various protections provided for in rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
47. See notes 218-41 infra. and accompanying text.
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HI. THE GREAT DEBATE
A. The "Relevance" Argument
The IRS compels production of data through its summons
power.4" Thus, if the agent's request for the tax reserve file, reports
to management, or the audit workplan is resisted during the course
of an audit, he may issue a summons for them."9 Should the sum-
moned party fail to comply, the IRS may request the Justice De-
partment to bring suit to enforce the summons.50 The require-
48. I.R.C. § 7602; see note 2 supra.
49. Prior to May 14, 1981, IRS guidelines, see I INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT
(CCH) § 4024 (June 8, 1976), restricted the issuance of summonses for tax accrual
workpapers only in the sense that a prior report to the National Office of the IRS should be
made in a "potentially sensitive situation." A Treasury Department information notice,
however, provides that the examiner should "exhaust all efforts to obtain an explanation of
the items in [the tax] reserve from the taxpayer's records and the responsible corporate
executives with knowledge before seeking the information from independent accountants for
the corporation." INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INFORMATION
NOTICE No. 80-7, REQUESTS FOR AccouNTrN's WORKPAPERS 2 (1980). Moreover, "[t]he ex-
aminer's interest in the items is limited to identification of material undisclosed positions
taken by the taxpayer on the return which the substantially completed examination has left
unexplained, not opinions or evaluations concerning the items." Id.
More recently, Deputy Commissioner William E. Williams stated that the IRS is revis-
ing these Manual provisions "to make it absolutely clear that examiners are not to request
tax accrual workpapers from the taxpayer or the accountant as a standard examination pro-
cedure." Quoted in BNA Daily Tax Report, March 16, 1981, at 1. The IRS published the
revisions on May 14, 1981. Under new Manual section 4024.4, Guidelines for Requesting
Audit or Tax Accrual Workpapers, the agent may examine such papers only in "unusual
circumstances," only when factual data cannot be obtained from the taxpayer's records and
not as a matter of standard examining procedure. The request must relate to an issue the
agent has already spotted, and the request must be limited to those portions of the papers
which bear on that issue. The agent must also first take all reasonable means, including the
use of a summons, to secure the information from the taxpayer himself. I INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL-AUDIT (CCH) § 4024.4 (May 14, 1981).
This revision does not apply to criminal investigations, however. The revision was
brought to the attention of the district judge in United States v. Price Waterhouse, 515 F.
Supp. 996 (N.D. IM. 1981) (mem.) who did not address it in his opinion. The revision's
transmittal letter specified that its provisions were not retroactive.
50. The summons is not self-executing. Upon a failure to comply, the Government
must petition for enforcement in the federal district court where the summoned party re-
sides or is found. I.R.C. § 7604(a). The summoned party or intervenor, see Donaldson v.
United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); I.R.C. § 7609, then has the right to an adversary hearing,
during which available defenses may be raised. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445 (1964).
The proceeding is a summary one, however, I.R.C. § 7609(h), and if the party opposing the
summons neither places any of the petition's allegations in controversy nor comes forward
with specific facts in support of a legally sufficient defense, no evidentiary hearing is re-
quired. United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Freedom
Church, 613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Genser, 602 F.2d 69 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979); United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
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ments for enforcement are four:5' (1) The summons must be issued
for a legitimate purpose; (2) the Service must show that the sum-
moned data "may be relevant" to this purpose;52 (3) the data
sought must not already be in the Service's possession;53 and (4)
the required administrative steps must be followed.5
The relevance requirement is the standard upon which ac-
51. The Supreme Court set forth these requirements in United States v. Powell, 379
U.S. 48 (1964). When the Service's Criminal Investigation Division conducts an investiga-
tion, there is arguably a fifth requirement to allege and prove that the IRS has not formally
recommended prosecution of the taxpayer to the United States Department of Justice.
United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978). But see United States v. Kis, 658
F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1981).
52. The relevance requirement derives in part from the language of § 7602, which per-
mits the summoning of documents that "may be relevant" to the investigation of a return or
of tax liability. I.R.C. § 7602. It also derives from the series of cases that culminated in
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), in which the Supreme Court articulated the
general standards for the enforcement of administrative process. Under those cases, the sub-
poena or summons is to be enforced regardless of the lack of probable cause, but only if the
inquiry is within the agency's power, the data sought are relevant to that inquiry, and the
demand is not overbroad or burdensome. Id.; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
53. United States v. Lenon, 579 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Garrett, 571
F.2d 1323 (5th Cir!1978). Courts have literally construed the "in possession" requirement to
encompass only the exact records summoned. Focusing on the term "information," which
was loosely used in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964), some parties have argued
that tax reserve data "information" is in the Service's "possession" because of the hundreds
of thousands of documents already produced, the total access afforded IRS agents to the
corporation's books and records, and the presumed ability of the agents to reproduce the
accountant's work from the raw data. Courts in each case have flatly rejected this sugges-
tion. See United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (mem.);
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v.
First Chicago Corp., 43 A.F.T.R.2d 79-704 (N.D. IM. 1978) (mem.); United States v. Acker,
325 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942
(D. Colo. 1975), aff'd 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977), the court rejected a liberal interpreta-
tion of the "possession" requirement. Id. at 949. Moreover, the Second Circuit has stated
that the argument "borders on the frivolous." United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125 n.2
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979). Even when data may actually be in the
Service's files, but simply difficult to retrieve, the courts generally have held that the Service
has proved lack of possession. See United States v. Kis, 658 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. First Nat'l State Bank, 616
F.2d 668 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980). But compare United States v. Garrett,
571 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1978) with United States v. Goldman, 637 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1980)
and United States v. Pritchard, 438 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1971).
54. The Supreme Court in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), confined this
requirement to a showing that a reopening letter had been issued under the provisions of
I.R.C. § 7605(b). Nevertheless, the requirement has evolved into a more general standard,
and the courts have indicated that minor discrepancies in the "administrative steps" do not
void the summons. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Myslajek, 568 F.2d 55 (8th
Cir. 1977).
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countants most frequently rely in opposing summonses for tax re-
serve and other sensitive papers. Thus, in United States v.
Coopers & Lybrand,"" the first reported case in this area, the ac-
countants successfully argued that enforcement of the summons
should be denied because the tax reserve data were not "relevant"
to the Service's investigation. Both the district court and the
Tenth Circuit in Coopers & Lybrand refused to enforce a summons
for tax reserve files that Coopers & Lybrand (the summoned
party) had prepared in connection with an audit of its client,
Johns-Manville Corporation. Each court strongly emphasized that
Coopers & Lybrand did not prepare Johns-Manville's tax returns
for the audited years, and that the audit program and resulting
papers lacked a direct connection with the preparation or filing of
those returns. Furthermore, the district court stressed, and the
Government conceded, that the data did not relate to the specific
matters under audit, but only in a general way to the return.6
Since Coopers & Lybrand prepared the files for financial statement
purposes and SEC requirements, and since they contained the
"private thoughts and theories of the taxpayer, 57 both courts rea-
soned that the fies were too remote from the Service's inquiry.
The courts also rejected the Government's suggestion that the files
might be probative of corporate intent for purposes of the fraud 8
or negligence" penalties. Further, because Johns-Manville did not
use the data to prepare the tax return under audit, the court rea-
soned that the files could not be relevant to potentially fraudulent
items on that return."
1. Relevance in General
The relevance standard, as applied to summonses, derives
from section 7602 of the Code,61 which provides for summoning
data that "may be relevant or material" to the Service's inquiry. In
United States v. Powell2 the Supreme Court held that the proba-
ble cause standard of the fourth amendment does not apply to the
55. 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
56. Id.; United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Il1. 1981)
(mem.).
57. 413 F. Supp. at 950, 550 F.2d at 618.
58. See I.R.C. § 6653(b).
59. See id. § 6653(a).
60. 550 F.2d at 621.
61. I.R.C. § 7602.
62. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
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enforcement of an IRS summons; relevance to the investigation,
together with satisfaction of the three other criteria.for enforce-
ment noted above, is sufficient. The Court in Powell did not elabo-
rate on the relevance concept, except to imply that the standards
applicable to other administrative agency process would be trans-
latable to determining the scope of the summons power.' s The
Powell Court did make clear, however, that this power is to be lib-
erally construed-much like the power of a grand jury, to which
the summons power has often been analogized. 4
Drawing an analogy to both the grand jury subpoena and that
administrative process, and noting the strong congressional inter-
est in vigorous enforcement of the revenue laws, courts since Pow-
ell have uniformly endorsed a low threshold for the relevance re-
quirement. So long as the summoned data "might throw light
upon '6 5 the correctness of either a taxpayer's return or his tax lia-
bility, the data meet the "may be relevant" test.6 Moreover, courts
63. See generally Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
Subpoenaed documents and testimony are relevant unless they are "plainly incompetent or
irrelevant for any lawful purpose." Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509
(1943), quoted in SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 482 F. Supp. 555, 562 (W.D. Pa.
1979), vacated and remanded, 648 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1981).
64. The Court stated, "While the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue de-
rives from a different body of statutes, [than the administrative subpoena and grand jury
subpoena powers] we do not think the analogies to other agency situations are without force
when the scope of the Commissioner's power is called in question." 379 U.S. at 57 (footnotes
omitted); accord, United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975); United States v. Rosinsky,
547 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Joyce, 498 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454
(6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v.
McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967); DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963);
Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1959).
65. United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (mem.); United States v. Riley
Co., 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1164 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (mem.), appeal dismissed, No. 80-1124 (7th Cir.
Sept. 16, 1980); accord, United States v. Garden State Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 61 (3d Cir.
1979); United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979);
United States v. Rosinsky, 547 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1977); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d
183 (2d Cir. 1959); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953).
66. The notion appears in some cases that the standard of relevance may be higher for
summonses issued to third parties because of the potential for damage to their privacy in-
terests. Compare United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir. 1968) ("This judi-
cial protection ... is particularly appropriate in matters where the demand for records is
directed not to the taxpayer but to a third party who may have had some dealing with the
person under investigation.") with United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1978)
("The threshold [of relevance] is particularly low when, as here, the papers at issue are the
taxpayer's own and there is no question of the invasion of the privacy of third persons
against their will."), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979). Although some courts have read Har-
rington as requiring a higher standard, see United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F.
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appear to be growing reluctant to substitute their oversight role for
the acknowledged expertise of the IRS. If the minimal nexus exists
between the summoned data and a section 7602 purpose, the
courts rarely intrude further into the administrative process, in
which the precise relevance is actually determined,6" 7 nor will they
ordinarily conduct even an in camera examination of the data. 8
The Supreme Court in 1980 effectively endorsed this "hands-off"
principle in United States v. Euge.69
Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the
Second Circuit appears to have undercut its Harrington dictum in Noall; the low standard
is "might throw light upon," and would be lower if the summons were to the taxpayer itself.
United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d at 126. Harrington, however, cannot fairly be read to im-
pose a higher standard of relevance for third party summonses. The court in Harrington
evidenced its concern for third party privacy by formulating the "might throw light upon"
standard in the first place; it did not suggest that any higher standard existed. In any event,
the outside accountants who create tax reserve data cannot legitimately claim any higher
standard, since their claim to privacy is attenuated at best. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322 (1973). See also part Ill infra. Moreover, a higher standard than the marginal relevance
than is now required may well be unworkable. To meet this standard, the IRS would have to
show that it did not need the document-because it already had a good case-to demon-
strate its right to have it produced. See United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.
1968). In short, the IRS need not be required to demonstrate specific relevance in order to
meet the Powell standard. See United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (mem.).
67. As the court stated in Price Waterhouse, the Government need not demonstrate to
the Court the specific relevance of data it has not seen on issues it has not spotted. United
States v. Riley Co., 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1164, (N.D. IlM. 1980) (mem.), appeal dismissed, No.
80-1124 (7th Cir. Sept. 16, 1980); United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
The Court in Riley stated that "the Service is expected to examine much irrelevant material
in order to sift out the material that may be relevant to an investigation." 45 A.F.T.R.2d at
80-1165; accord, United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
923 (1979); United States v. First Chicago Corp., 43 A.F.T.R.2d 79-704 (N.D. Ill 1978)
(mem.).
68. Compare United States v. First Chicago Corp., 43 A.F.T.R.2d 79-704 (N.D. Ill
1978) (mem.) with United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
923 (1979), United States v. Riley Co., 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1164 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (mem.), ap-
peal dismissed, No. 80-1124 (7th Cir. Sept. 16, 1980) and United States v. Arthur Young &
Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). At least one court has ascribed to the agent's judg-
ment the determination whether sufficient indication of relevance exists for judicial pur-
poses. See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 329-30 (D. Mass.
1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1021 (1980), aff'd as to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980) ("I find that the collective
familiarity of the agents involved in the joint investigation as to Good Hope records will
suffice to establish a 'realistic expectation' of relevancy.") While such a concept probably
goes beyond the holding in Powell, the court's deference to the administrative process and
the agents' expertise is entirely appropriate, particularly in view of recent precedent in the
Supreme Court. See United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980).
69. 444 U.S. 707, 711 (1980). The Court stated,
Further, this Court has consistently construed congressional intent to require that if
the summons authority claimed is necessary for the effective performance of congres-
sionally imposed responsibilities to enforce the tax code, that authority should be up-
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Considering this trend in the courts, it is difficult to justify the
Coopers & Lybrand test for relevance, which requires that the ac-
countants must have compiled the summoned data for use in, or at
least in the preparation of, the taxpayer's return.70 Section 7602
itself provides for the summoning of data that "may be relevant"
to aid in "making a return where none has been made," as well as
in "determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue
tax."7' Thus, neither the statute nor logic requires that data must
be used to prepare, or be associated with the preparation of, a tax
return in order to be relevant to that return or to a taxpayer's cor-
rect liability. Extended to its logical conclusion, the Coopers &
Lybrand's standard would permit a taxpayer who kept one true
and one false set of books to prevent enforcement of a summons
for the true set; he would simply argue that he did not use the
summoned (true) set to prepare his (possibly false) return. Com-
mon sense dictates that papers-regardless of when or for what
purpose they were created-which evaluate financial data that the
taxpayer has included on his tax return, or which are probative of
his tax liability, would also help an auditor evaluate the statements
reported on the return. For these reasons, courts since Coopers &
Lybrand have uniformly rejected that decision's rationale in favor
of a broader concept of relevance. 2
held absent express statutory prohibition or substantial countervailing policies. The
authority claimed here is necessary for the effective exercise of the Service's enforce-
ment responsibilities; it is entirely consistent with the statutory language; and it is not
in derogation of any constitutional rights or countervailing policies enunciated by
Congress.
Id.
70. See also United States v. First Chicago Corp., 43 A.F.T.R.2d 79-704 (N.D. Ill.
1978) (mem.).
71. I.R.C. § 7602.
72. See note 68 supra and cases cited therein. In the most recent case, the court in
Price Waterhouse flatly rejected the accountants' contention that a tax reserve memoran-
dum was not relevant where the issues the memorandum discussed had not yet been de-
tected by the examining agent. The court stated,
Moreover, under [Price Waterhouse's] theory, the task of deciding what issues have
been identified by the IRS would fall upon the summoned party, thus allowing that
party to control the scope of the audit. This result can hardly be deemed acceptable
and certainly was not the intent of Congress in drafting the broad authorizing language
found in section 7602. See United States v. Riley Co., 45 AFTR 2d 80-1164, 80-1
USTC Section 9157 (N.D. Ill. 1980); United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). Finally, respondents' argument ...would permit the taxpayer to
withhold relevant information unless the IRS stated the magic words identifying the
issue. This, however, would misconstrue the purpose of the summons procedure, which
is to determine the truthful scope of the taxpayer's liability, rather than to engage in a
sophisticated game of hide and seek.
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2. Relevance of Tax Reserve Files, Reports to Management, and
Audit Workplans
Tax reserve files and reports to management, if available to
the IRS, may affect a taxpayer's exposure to audit adjustments in
several ways.7 3 If, for example, the taxpayer improperly prices
goods sold to affiliates, the IRS may reallocate income to the tax-
payer under section 482, 4 with the attendant tax consequences.75
Similarly, a report to management that is critical of a corporation's
accounts receivable treatment, intercompany accounting practices,
or inventory statistics, for example, could cause an IRS agent to
pursue those leads to important tax return items, possibly with un-
pleasant tax consequences for the corporation. 6
The analysis, opinion, and speculation aspects of tax reserve
United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 999-1000 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(mem.).
73. It is somewhat inconsistent for the accounting profession to argue that the data
are irrelevant while litigating so vigorously over their production. Indeed, the intensity of
opposition is more likely a true indicator of relevance. As the court noted in United States v.
Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979), the taxpayer's own
statements showed that the internal audit reports were the taxpayer's internal auditors'
analyses of the books and records of various corporate divisions and related corporations
and were part of the taxpayer's program to monitor and supervise the accounting, financial
planning and established operational plans and procedures of those divisions and corpora-
tions. The taxpayer had attempted with these reports to ensure uniform bookkeeping prac-
tices and compliance with management directives and internal control and operational pro-
cedures. Even though the documents may have contained hearsay, rumors, and opinions, the
court stated that the taxpayer's own description of the utilization of the reports demon-
strated their relevance. The Service was interested in discovering whether the tax returns
reflected the taxpayer's true income picture, not simply whether the accountants correctly
prepared them from the books of account. Accord, United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.
1980).
74. I.R.C. § 482.
75. Conversely, the reserve could confirm the agent's confidence in the return as filed;
such confirmation is one of the functions of an audit.
76. This discussion implicitly assumes a concept of relevance that applies to leads to
evidence-in addition to direct-impact data-and to areas of a tax return that had not yet
come under audit. It is a common practice in tax investigations to trace data through several
stages and ultimately arrive at a previously unsuspected item of liability. Accord, Reporters
Comm. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (telephone records are
useful leads), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474
F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.
1980); In re D.I. Operating Co., 14 A.F.T.R.2d 5879 (D. Nev. 1964) (temporary, disposable
cards kept as convenient records of daily transactions); see United States v. First Chicago
Corp., 43 A.F.T.R.2d 79-704 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (mem.) (audit reports relevant because they
give agents the chance to investigate areas in which current information is lacking).
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files and reports to management can also affect the outcome of an
audit. First, the agent often looks to the opinion in the documents
to gauge the accountants' degree of confidence in the tax reserve,
as well as to spot potentially weak areas that deserve further scru-
tiny. A typical reserve file might contain the statement, "In our
opinion, the corporation's reserve for contingencies resulting from
foreign operations is inadequate because the IRS might assign to
the domestic return some additional items of foreign income." This
statement, though nonfactual and perhaps even speculative, lets
the agent know that the taxpayer's allocation of income between
domestic and foreign corporations may be questionable. It at least
indicates to the agent that the accountants themselves doubt the
reliability of the corporation's tax judgments. These realizations
certainly would "throw light" upon either the correctness of the
return or the taxpayer's correct liabilities. In United States v.
Price Waterhouse & Co.,77 for example, the record contains a tax
reserve memorandum that pointed out several hundred thousand
dollars .in potentially taxable items and indicated how the IRS
could detect these items in the books. 8 Similarly, a report to man-
agement might expose weaknesses in the corporation's controls
over assets, which in turn might lead an agent to question the ac-
curacy of the assets reported on the tax return. The importance of
such statements to an effective tax audit is clear.
Concerning the audit workplan, the courts in Coopers &
Lybrand and United States v. Arthur Young & Co.19 denied en-
forcement of summonses for audit workplans on the ground that
they were not records of actual transactions, but were mere "pro-
jections." 80 Respondents successfully argued that the Service's
interest lay exclusively in actual transactions, since only actual
transactions can affect corporate tax liability. In other words, the
77. 515 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (mem.).
78. With respect to the relevancy of these documents the Price Waterhouse court
noted that
every court that has considered the question has held that the IRS has the right to
review documents containing opinions, regardless of whether the government already
has documents that contain the factual bases for those opinions....
...[S]uch opinions are very likely to be relevant to the issue of tax liability.
United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (mem.).
79. 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
80. But see United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass.
1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1021 (1980), aff'd as to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980). In Arthur Andersen the
court compelled production of the audit workplan.
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accounting firms contended that the Service's interest lay in what
actually occurred, not in what the accountants thought or planned
to audit. Nevertheless, the audit workplans may be relevant to an
IRS examination with or without the later audit workpapers or
final tax reserve files. A "battle plan" obviously helps the analyst
discern what occurred or failed to occur in the "battle" itself.
Thus, in nonfraud investigations the agent wants to know what ar-
eas the accountant intended to review and to check so that he can
compare them to what was eventually examined. He then can focus
on potential problem areas if, for instance, the actual investigation
was much less comprehensive than the original plan; conversely, he
can satisfy himself that the accountant audited the item properly,
and that he need pursue the matter no further."1
3. Relevance in Fraud Investigations
In IRS investigations that the Criminal Investigation Division
conducts,8 2 when the potential for assertion of criminal fraud ex-
ists, an extra dimension is added. In United States v. Arthur An-
dersen & Co.,8 3 a case that dealt with a special agent's summons
for tax reserve data, the district court first rejected the account-
ants' contention that they should be accorded an accountant-client
privilege. It then held that the tax reserve files would likely shed
81. See United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996, 1000 (2d Cir. 1976) (Summoned com-
puter tapes "would incidentally insure greater accuracy and a substantial saving in auditing
time by enabling the IRS, through use of the taxpayer's own medium, to trace transactions
from the original documents to the tax returns.").
82. The Criminal Investigation Division investigates allegations of criminal violations
of the tax laws, whereas the Examination Division is concerned solely with civil mat-
ters-including, however, civil fraud, negligence, and other penalties. The functions of the
two divisions, however, are closely related, and the Supreme Court has construed their du-
ties to be "inherently intertwined." United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 309
(1978); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971). See also United States v. Garden
State Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928 (D.
Md. 1968).
83. 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d
720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st
Cir. 1980). In a companion case, United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 43 A.F.T.R.2d 79-
1161 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam), the court rejected the appeal of the intervening taxpayer,
Good Hope Industries, since the respondent in that case had already produced the sum-
moned data. The court similarly disposed of the contention which the individuals under
investigation-the Stanleys, Good Hope's officers and owners-advanced, namely, that the
summoned data did not pertain to their particular liabilities. Since one portion of the docu-
ment, an outline of a corporate meeting, did pertain to the individuals, the Second Circuit
ordered production of the remaining portions, since they "possibly" could throw light on the
individual's liability. Thus, the court rejected the notion of "bifurcated" or "selective"
relevance.
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light on the taxpayer's correct liabilities and affect the outcome of
the fraud issue. The files, therefore, were relevant, since Arthur
Andersen had applied the procedures and systems of analysis di-
rectly to the actual transactions reported on the return.8
4
Two elements generally comprise the proof of tax fraud: A
false return or false statement and fraudulent intent.8 5 The requi-
site fraudulent intent derives from many sources, including-and
often-the taxpayer himself. In the alternative, the accountant
may conclude after analyzing the taxpayer's papers and returns
that the failure to include an item of income, or its inclusion
against the accountant's advice, is erroneous, negligent, or fraudu-
lent.8 6 The accountant also may find that the taxpayer's treatment
of some accounts is absolutely contrary to the law or normal ac-
counting procedures; the client is then on unequivocal notice of po-
tentially fraudulent conduct. The accountant's duties of analysis,
conclusion, and notice assist the agent in establishing a negligence
or fraud case. It is precisely this type of data that may find its way
into tax reserve files or reports to management. Thus, the same
files that can assist in establishing an understatement or a false
return may also provide evidence of-or at least lead to-a finding
of fraudulent intent. Since the fraud penalties are a potential com-
84. 474 F. Supp. at 326-31. The court's reasoning in Andersen is not readily apparent.
If the court meant that any affected transaction would increase the 50% fraud penalty on
that particular transaction and other underpayments, then the statement resembles a tru-
ism; the fraud penalty is thereby relegated to the status of a mere mathematical calculation.
On the other hand, the court may have meant that the tax reserve data, when analyzed
together with the actual transactions, would be probative on corporate intent. Accord, In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 483 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Minn.), stay granted, 483 F.
Supp. 1091 (D. Minn. 1979).
85. See generally United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976); Sansone v. United
States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965); Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
86. In the district court's decision in United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F.
Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), the court rejected the Government's contention that the audit
program was relevant because it would show which transactions the accountants had in fact
audited, which could in turn reveal the corporation's intent. The court reasoned that the
Government's purpose was beyond the reach of I.R.C. § 7602, since it failed to fall within
one of the four purposes enumerated in that section for the issuance of a summons. If the
court's reasoning ever had any precedential foundation, see Donaldson v. United States, 400
U.S. 517 (1971), the Supreme Court in United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298
(1978), undercut that foundation when it restated the law that IRS investigations normally
promote the dual goals of discovering both civil and criminal liability, and that a summons
may issue to discover criminal fraud.
Moreover, if the court in Coopers & Lybrand was implying that the audit program
would be relevant if the investigation graduated to the fraud level, then its reasoning of-
fends the Powell doctrine that no probable cause to suspect fraud-or to suspect even a civil
violation-need be shown to inquire about or summon data.
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ponent of every tax investigation,"7 the tax reserve files and reports
to management are highly relevant to these inquiries.
Concerning the audit workplan, a special agent in a fraud in-
vestigation wants to know whether and why the accountants did or
did not pursue their intention to audit particular accounts. This
knowledge can aid the agent in forming a conclusion on the issue
of fraudulent intent. The presence of the accountants' resulting re-
ports-with background papers or files-should not preclude the
IRS from obtaining the audit workplan if the applicable standard
is "might throw light"; the inquiry is not whether the plan is less
relevant than the resulting report or files, but whether the work-
plan by itself might throw light on the accuracy of the return.
4. The "Convenience," Limitation on Relevance
Despite the considerations discussed thus far, some courts
have drawn the line of relevance at the point of "mere conve-
nience." That is, these courts have held that data which merely
make life more convenient for the IRS are not thereby relevant.
This argument derives from the Tenth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Matras,8 8 which a few reported cases have cited approv-
ingly, but without careful analysis." In Matras the IRS summoned
the corporate taxpayer to produce its company-wide budgets for
the audited year. The district court9" denied enforcement and rea-
soned that only actual transactions, not proposed budgets, could
have tax consequences. The court of appeals91 agreed noting that
the taxpayer had made available all other records bearing on
actual transactions, and that the Government could not sustain its
87. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
88. 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973).
89. United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977). Contra,
United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal of one
party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as
to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 483
F. Supp. 1085, 1089 (D. Minn. 1979), stay granted, 483 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Minn. 1979); In re
Co-Build Cos., 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-308 (E.D. Pa. 1977). These three courts generally distin-
guished Matras, rather than disapproved it, on the ground that whereas the court in Matras
had dealt with projections, their cases dealt with actual transactions. The distinction, how-
ever, is not logically supportable. The tax reserve cases enforced in full summonses or sub-
poenas for tax reserve papers that appeared, in part, to be projections of future tax liabili-
ties based upon past conduct. The type of projections of future deductible expenses-or
budgets-in Matras are not different in kind from the tax reserve files' projection of future
nondeductible expenses, which relate to inventory, bad debts, and the like.
90. 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-725 (D. Neb. 1972).
91. 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973).
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burden to show relevance by alleging a general need for a
"roadmap." The court concluded that the term "relevance" encom-
passed more than "convenience. ' 92 Despite the limited nature of
the holding in Matras,93 other courts have applied the concept to
deny enforcement of summonses for audit workplans, 4 but not for
tax reserve files, even though the latter also contain a "roadmap"
of potential future liabilities for which reserves must be accrued.
The validity of the convenience argument almost always will
be a matter of degree. Thus, it is surely more "convenient" for the
IRS to summon accountants' audit workpapers to retrace and
check the calculations and tests than it is for the agents themselves
to perform the same tasks from the original books of entry. Never-
theless, the courts have upheld the enforcement of summonses for
92. Id. at 1275.
93. The court made clear how limited its holding was when it stated,
As the court observed in the Harrington case, supra, the question whether materi-
als sought by summons may be relevant does not always lend itself easily to solution.
Based on the rationale of the authorities cited herein, we recognize that given the
proper factual setting a court could find that budgets are potentially relevant to a tax
investigation. Obviously, that issue must be determined on an ad hoc basis. Certainly, a
taxpayer should not erect roadblocks for the purpose of frustrating or preventing the
IRS from a full-scale inquiry of the liability of the taxpayer. By the same token, the
government should not, for the mere sake of its convenience, impose unnecessary bur-
dens on a taxpayer in conducting an audit or investigation for tax liability, particularly
where, as here, there is no indication of a purpose to escape any tax liability. The term
"relevant" connotes and encompasses more than "convenience." Consequently, we are
not persuaded to fault the district judge for concluding that the government failed to
sustain its burden of proof by alleging a general need for a "road map." If we were to
accede to the government's view, it is difficult to imagine corporate materials that
might not contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the workings of the
corporation, and thus, according to the government, be deemed relevant to the tax
investigation.
Id. at 1274-75. Thus, the court was prepared to draw a line-under the particular facts in
Matras-at budget requests because it saw no other stopping point. Of course, the point of
burdensomeness or overbreadth can always be a line of demarcation, United States v. Pow-
ell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), but short of this liberally construed boundary, courts have not seen
fit to restrict the summons-even for massive numbers of documents-as long as the rele-
vance standard is met. United States v. Giordano, 419 F. 2d 564 (8th Cir. 1969) (summons
for all corporate taxpayer's internal reports was not overbroad; IRS has been "licensed to
fish"), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970); United States v. First Pa. Bank, 453 F. Supp. 457
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (summons for "all records in the bank's possession or under its control
relating to" the taxpayer held not overbroad); United States v. Ruggeiro, 300 F. Supp. 968
(C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 922 (1971) (sum-
mons for "all financial and business transactions" for investigated years, requiring 607
truckloads of documents, held not overbroad).
94. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United
States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir.
1977).
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such records with near unanimity.9 5 Moreover, the term "conven-
ience" begins to lose meaning in large-case audits.9 8 The record in
Coopers & Lybrand, for example, contains references to Johns-
Manville's 3,000 company computer programs, 90,000 separate ac-
counts, and 200,000 invoices per month.9 7 Although the large staff
available to Coopers & Lybrand might be able to test check accu-
rately a relatively large number of items or accounts, IRS resources
available for a similar effort pale in comparison. It is, quite simply,
impossible-from a resources perspective-for the IRS, or perhaps
for anyone else, to perform a complete audit of any major corpora-
tion. For this reason, disclosure of the product of the auditors and
accountants who have already gone through the corporate books is
a necessity rather than a convenience. When weaknesses or poten-
tial extra liabilities exist, tax reserve and management report data
can lead the agent directly or indirectly to them. Without this
groundwork, the laws of probability and the agent's past experi-
ence might be all that govern the chances of discovering potential
adjustments. Moreover, it is a common practice for agents to rely
on company auditors' work to complete their examination; the two
"antagonists" often work in tandem. If the company auditor ap-
pears to have exercised reasonable thoroughness, the agent fre-
quently accepts the results on their face. Thus, our entire system
of corporate taxation and tax auditing is predicated upon the
premise that the Government can-and must-rely, in large part,
upon the integrity and work product of the taxpayers' internal au-
ditors and outside accountants. This notion of reliance-as op-
posed to gamesmanship-partly underlay the Second Circuit's de-
cision in United States v. Davey.98 In Davey the court upheld a
95. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Falsone v. United States,
205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); United States v. Hankins, 424 F.
Supp. 606 (N.D. Miss. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, dismissed in part, 565 F.2d 1344
(5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979), add'l contempt order reversed, 624 F.2d
649 (5th Cir. 1980). But see United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying enforcement, without apparent explanation, of a summons
for "audit workpapers"; the final enforcement order, however, did not withhold these
workpapers).
96. Large-case audits fall under the "Coordinated Examination Program" (CEP).
These cases are so designated according to several criteria, including gross assets and gross
receipts. The ranges for gross assets are from "up to $500 million" to "over $10 billion." The
gross receipts category ranges from "up to $1 billion" to "over $5 billion." INTERNAL REVE-
NUE MANUAL-AUDIT § 42(11)(o).
97. Brief for Appellees at 10, United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615 (10th
Cir. 1977).
98. 543 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976).
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summons for Continental Insurance Company's computer tape re-
cordations of hundreds of thousands of transactions. In rejecting
the company's suggestion that production of the tapes would be a
mere convenience, the court first noted that if the subject matter
of the records was not otherwise relevant, mere convenience would
not make it so. The Davey court held that the test for relevance is
not whether the tapes would be a convenience to the IRS, but
whether the data would throw light upon the correctness of the
taxpayer's returns. If they did this, the records would be subject to
production even though they were also a convenience to the IRS.
Significantly, the court also noted that the tapes "would inciden-
tally insure greater accuracy and a substantial saving in auditing
time by enabling the IRS, through use of the taxpayer's own record
medium, to trace transactions from the original documents to the
tax returns."991
The court's rationale in Davey is at odds with the reasoning in
Matras. Davey would measure relevance by focusing upon that
term's traditional test, namely the "might throw light" standard;
that the data might make the Service's task more convenient is
salutary, even praiseworthy, rather than suspect. The Matras
court, on the other hand, views the situation from a gamesmanship
perspective: even though data could throw light on the correctness
of the return, if the Service's task is simply made more convenient,
the burden on the taxpayer justifies refusing to compel production.
The Davey approach more nearly comports with the realities
of auditing large-or even medium-sized-corporations. The ap-
proach is also consistent with the law's general principle that barri-
ers to the truth are not favored, 100 as well as with the high national
priority given to the collection of revenue. 101 Moreover, under the
present case law, it is difficult to justify a convenience limitation
on relevance beyond the outside limit of burdensomeness. The Su-
preme Court placed no such limitation on relevance when it formu-
lated the standard in Powell. It did, however, discuss the outer
limits of the summons power in terms of "burdensomeness," "har-
assment," "collateral purpose," and "bad faith."10  Most cases
99. Id. at 1000.
100. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937) ("The suppression of truth is a
grievous necessity at best, more especially when as here the inquiry concerns the public
interest; it can be justified at all only when the opposed private interest is supreme."); 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (McNaughton rev. 1961) § 2192.
101. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
102. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
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since Powell that have considered the relevance of various data
likewise have held them relevant under the "might throw light"
standard, even though the data coincidentally made the Service's
task more convenient.10 The notion of convenience as a limitation
on the summons power, therefore, lacks precedential and logical
force, and the courts should not adopt it.
B. Policy Considerations
The second major source of defenses to IRS summonses for
accountants' papers is nonstatutory public policy arguments, which
accountants and their clients claim justify the confidentiality of
tax reserve and management report data. The inhibitory effect on
accountant-client relations that a breach of confidentiality might
produce, the alleged deleterious effect on the independent audit
process, and the potential problems of reduced compliance with
other legal disclosure requirements, are all asserted to justify non-
disclosure from a policy perspective.1 0 4
An understanding of the dimensions of this position must
begin with the Supreme Court's decision in Couch v. United
States.1 0 5 In Couch an IRS agent summoned a taxpayer's account-
ant to produce both the taxpayer's records and the accountant's
workpapers that were pertinent to the Service's investigation. The
summoned data were ordinary workpapers, not tax reserve files or
reports to management. The accountant refused to produce the
documents, and the Government petitioned for enforcement.
Couch, the intervening taxpayer, argued that enforcement should
be denied because of an accountant-client privilege recognized
under state law. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, not-
ing that no federal law sanctioned an accountant's privilege and
103. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l State Bank, 616 F.2d 668 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980); United States v. Shlom, 420 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1969) (corporate
records and journals), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1074 (1970); United States v. Rizzo, 45
A.F.T.R.2d 80-1479 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (temporary patient account cards). Compare United
States v. Richards, 631 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1980) (eleven question "slush fund" questionnaire
to corporations modified) with United States v. Wyatt, 637 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1981) (enforc-
ing summons for eleven questions).
104. United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979), ap-
peal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021
(1980), aff'd as to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980). See also Barnes, IRS Access to
Accountants' Workpapers: The Coopers & Lybrand Case, 7 TAX ADV. 44 (1976); Hansen &
Lees, IRS Examination of Accountants' Workpapers, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Apr. 1977, at 60;
Horvitz & Hainkel, The IRS Summons Power and Its Effect on the Independent Auditor, 4
J. ACCOUNTING, AUDITING AND FINANCE 114 (1980).
105. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
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that no federal cases had recognized a state law privilege. The
Court went further, however, and declared that "there [is no] justi-
fication for such a privilege where records relevant to income tax
returns are involved in a criminal investigation or prosecution."'10
The Couch Court gave three reasons for its refusal to recognize a
federal accountant-client privilege. First, the taxpayer can have lit-
tle expectation of privacy when he surrenders records to an ac-
countant, since he knows in advance that mandatory disclosure of
"much of the information therein" is required in an income tax
return.107 Second, the data to be disclosed are largely in the ac-
countant's, not the taxpayer's, discretion. Last, an accountant him-
self risks prosecution if he knowingly assists in the preparation of a
false return.108 Thus, the Court reasoned, the accountant's need for
self-protection often requires that the right to disclose information
upon demand be vested in him rather than the client. The Court
rejected the concept of a legitimate expectation of privacy on the
ground that expectations and obligations of mandatory disclosure
prompted the creation of the papers in the first instance, and that
the accountant himself also labored under independent legal obli-
gations, which required him to disclose certain information. 0 9
Couch effectively preempted any suggestion that an account-
ant-client privilege exempts tax reserve files from disclosure to the
IRS.110 Since Couch, therefore, the accounting profession has at-
tempted to argue for recognition of a quasi- or limited privilege,
although it has not phrased its arguments in these terms. Instead,
accountants have argued that disclosure-or the threat of disclo-
sure-would chill the client's candor with its internal auditors and
106. Id. at 335.
107. Id.
108. Accountants' exposure to civil and criminal liability for preparing a false return is
independent of the fraud or nonfraud classification of an IRS investigation. That the Intelli-
gence Division was investigating Mrs. Couch for fraud, therefore, was not a consideration in
the Supreme Court's holding.
109. 409 U.S. at 335 (1973). See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no legit-
imate expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed from home phone); United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records); Califor-
nia Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (legitimate expectation of privacy in a public telephone
booth).
110. Lower courts that have faced the issue since Couch have rejected the notion of a
privilege. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 483 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Minn.), stay granted, 483 F.
Supp. 1091 (D. Minn. 1979); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322 (D.
Mass. 1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1021 (1980), aff'd as to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980).
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outside accountants,11' which would undermine the independence
of the audit process and the purity and quality of the accountants'
oversight role.112 The profession has argued that this deleterious
effect in turn contravenes public policies, which favor complete
candor and are evident in the securities laws and fiduciary princi-
ples. Furthermore, accountants have contended that the potential
exists for the improper or compelled disclosure of the data once it
is in the hands of the IRS, particularly through vehicles such as
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suits."' s Finally, the account-
ing profession has contended that the special features of the
accountant-client relationship,"' at least when the parties are
dealing with tax reserve data, create a justifiable expectation of
confidentiality that should be honored against the summons." 5
111. Several accounting firms have made this argument, and the courts have rejected
it. United States v. Noal, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978) (Congress decided the policy issue in
favor of disclosure to the IRS by enacting I.R.C. § 7602), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979);
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (independence
might be undermined, but defendant still has neither a privilege nor any legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy); United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 472 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass. 1979),
appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021
(1980), aff'd as to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980) (defense to proffered argument
would carve out one class from I.R.C. § 7602, which invites a liberal construction); United
States v. First Chicago Corp., 43 A.F.T.R.2d 79-704 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (mem.) (taxpayer de-
claring report to be private does not ipso facto make it so). Even in United States v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977),
the argument received little discussion. See also Barnes, supra note 104; Caplin, supra note
36; Caplin, IRS Toughens its Stance on Summoning Accountants' Tax Accrual
Workpapers, 53 J. TAx. 130 (1980); Horvitz & Hainkel, supra note 104.
112. Barnes, supra note 104 ("basic integrity" of the audit process is at stake). But see
57 MINN. L. REv. 807 (1973) (self-evaluative reports will be generated anyway, since they are
a condition of some federal contracts).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). See subpart B(2) infra.
114. See Rithoz, The Representatives' Responsibility in Fraud and Penalty Cases,
51 TAXES 852 (1973). Ritholz states in a related context,
The relationship between accountant and client is unique .... In contrast to the rela-
tionship between attorney and client, the contacts and, therefore, the exchange of in-
formation and confidences between accountant and client are frequent and regular
.... The subject matter of this intercourse varies widely over the fields of taxation,
finances, provision for capital, conduct of business, management of office, sales, produc-
tion staff, etc., preparation of financial statements for nontax purposes, relationships
with lending and other institutions ....
Id.
115. The courts traditionally have not entertained considerations of accountants' pol-
icy interests as defenses to the summons power. The Supreme Court in Powell and Couch at
least implicitly refused to do so. Thus, once the four requirements of Powell are satisfied,
the general rule is to view the summons as enforceable unless a substantial material issue of
fact is presented in support of a legally sufficient defense. Accord, United States v. Price
Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (mem.) ("[T]he Court is not
unmindful of the policy arguments asserted by the respondents. However, the narrow ques-
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1. Threat to Candor Between Accountant and Client
The accountants' policy arguments merit attention, if for no
other reason but that a sound rational basis should support the
invasion of a professional's work product. The consideration of
conflicting policy principles implies that a balancing of interests
must be struck, even if, as Judge Friendly concluded in United
States v. Noall,11 one eventually concludes that Congress in sec-
tion 7602 has already struck such a balance.1 7 The balancing ap-
proach"18 would entail weighing the interests of the taxpayer and
the accountant, which were discussed above, against those favoring
enforcement of the summons.
The accountants' major policy position is that compelled pro-
duction of tax reserve files and reports to management would
erode the candor of communications between client and indepen-
dent auditor," 9 undermine the independent audit process, and de-
tion presently before the Court does not require that those policy concerns be addressed
herein."). See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978); United States v.
Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Genser III, 602 F.2d 69 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979); United States v. McGuirt, 588 F.2d 419 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979); United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d
36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978). Policy arguments, and sometimes even privi-
lege arguments do not form a part of the legal analysis of § 7602. See, e.g., United States v.
Schoenheinz, 548 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1977) (no stenographer-employer privilege); United
States v. Brown, 536 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1976) (no marital privilege); United States v.
Prevatt, 526 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1976) (no banker-depositor privilege); United States v. Lu-
ther, 481 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1973) (no priest-penitent privilege); Angiulo v. Mullins, 338 F.2d
820 (1st Cir. 1964) (no trustee-principal privilege); In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial
Hosp., 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953) (no physician-patient privilege). Contra, Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The Second Circuit in Noall addressed the argument
that policy should be considered and firmly rejected it. 587 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979). The court stated, "With respect to enforcement of the tax
laws, Congress itself has decided the policy issue, and it is not for the courts to challenge
that determination. In this, as in many other procedural questions, the collection of the
revenue stands apart." Id. But see note 1 supra.
116. 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
117. Id. at 126.
118. A balancing approach, however, would tend to prolong litigation, since experts
would have to adduce opinions on the relevant factors, both in general and in relation to the
particular case. This prolongation conflicts with the established judicial and congressional
policy favoring summary adjudication of summons enforcement matters. United States v.
Kis, 658 F.2d. 526 (7th Cir. 1981); see United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir.
1974); United States v. Davey, 426 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970); I.R.C. § 7609(h)(2). But see
I.R.C. § 7609(e). Section 7609(e) provides for suspension of the statutes of limitations in
certain summons enforcement cases.
119. The appellant in Couch made much the same argument in her brief to the Su-
preme Court. She argued that if the taxpayer knows his fifth amendment rights are unpro-
tected when he gives papers to an accountant, his incentive to cooperate will be reduced.
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 333 (1973).
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crease the client's efforts to ensure the integrity of its records, op-
erational procedures, and compliance with other laws. As the
Supreme Court suggested in Hickman v. Taylor,120 the conclusion
is not irrational that under some, albeit narrow, conditions, a pro-
fessional advisor might have an incentive not to create discoverable
work product if he knows that another party will attempt to obtain
it. To apply this suggestion to accountants' workpapers, however,
assumes that other law or principles do not compel the creation
and revelation of tax reserve data. This assumption is at variance
with the accountants' own strongly asserted position, raised in
most recent cases in this field,1"1 that the tax reserve data and re-
ports to management do not arise in response to the client's tax
return and preparation needs, a stance that the Government has
not opposed. On the contrary, the requirements of the securities
laws,1"2 federal statutory reporting requirements, 2 and obligations
and liability on the part of the accountants themselves 124 mandate
the creation of tax reserve data and the audit requirements of
corporations.
1 25
The Supreme Court traditionally has viewed this "chilling" ar-
gument with skepticism. Its precursor appeared in Couch, in which
the taxpayer argued in her brief that if she gave her tax-related
documents to her accountant, and if those documents thereby lost
whatever fifth amendment protection they might have had, the
taxpayer would have no incentive to make records accessible. Al-
though it only obliquely addressed the argument in its decision,
the Court implicitly rejected the "chilling" argument and held that
the taxpayer had no fifth amendment privilege in the papers once
she had surrendered them.12 Thus, the Court appeared to disre-
gard whatever policy implications inhered in the taxpayer's argu-
120. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
121. See notes 1 & 3 supra.
122. See notes 5-11 supra and accompanying text.
123. See id.; 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.5-02, .6-03 (1981).
124. See note 21 supra.
125. Ironically, the accountants use the existence of these myriad requirements to bol-
ster their second argument that to comply with the law, confidentiality is expected and
justified. It is somewhat inconsistent for the accountant to urge, on the one hand, that he
needs and expects confidentiality to fulfill his role in fostering compliance with the law, and
for him to argue, on the other hand, that the accounting work he wishes to do is not truly
required. The appellant made the very same argument-that the difficulties and time con-
straints encountered in the preparation of a tax return require specialized help-in her brief
to the Supreme Court in Couch, yet the Court rejected any notion that meeting these re-
quirements would result in the forfeiture of any constitutional rights. 409 U.S. at 333.
126. Id. at 334-35.
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ment. In a similar case, the Court in St. Regis Paper Co. v. United
States121 upheld a Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commis-
sion) subpoena that required St. Regis to supply to the FTC a copy
of a report which St. Regis had filed with the Census Bureau. St.
Regis argued that since the purpose of the census statute was to
encourage the free and full submission of statistical data, the
Court should hold that a confidential relationship exists and honor
it. The Court's response, however, was unequivocal: "Ours is the
duty to avoid a construction that would suppress otherwise compe-
tent evidence unless the statute, strictly construed, requires such a
result.' 128 St. Regis' argument is not materially different from the
one that other litigants have made about many reporting or disclo-
sure statutes: to encourage the candor that the particular statute
requires, courts should bar other interested agencies'29 from re-
questing the results. The more the law imposes public reporting
obligations upon corporations, however, the less likely this "chil-
ling" possibility becomes. Moreover, St. Regis Paper Co. appears
to resolve the competing policies in favor of disclosure, even
though the Supreme Court assumed that the undesirable chilling
effect would in fact occur.30
From the Service's perspective, the salient feature of this regu-
latory and agency reporting process is its alienation from the cor-
poration's duty to prepare a tax return. The accountant needs to
inquire into obvious and hidden contingencies on the financial
statements for independent, and compelling, reasons. The busi-
nessman, on the other hand, has a conflicting incentive to construe
potential contingencies narrowly and present a more favorable
financial statement. The independent accountant therefore, is re-
quired by law, regulations, and professional standards 31 to per-
form his analyses in accordance with the principles of conservatism
and independence, as well as to create a set of papers that identify
and discuss many potential tax liabilities. Whether the candor of
clients will be inhibited despite these mandates because of the su-
perimposed threat of a summons depends very much on the facts
of the individual case.
A corporation that maintains a policy of silence in response to
127. 368 U.S. 208 (1961).
128. Id. at 218. See also United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 711 (1980).
129. By extension, this argument also applies to any other private party, whose inter-
ests would not be as immediate or overriding as an agency's.
130. 368 U.S. at 216-20.
131. See notes 5-26 supra and accompanying text.
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inquiries from its accountant-because it fears that the results will
be subject to a summons-runs a substantial risk that the account-
ant will issue a qualified opinion or scope limitation on the
financial statement.13 2 The SEC, however, is not likely to accept
the accountant's reservations; if the qualified opinion or scope lim-
itation is revealed in a public document such as a 10-K report, the
corporation faces a sea of potential troubles or sanctions, including
delisting, investigations, and shareholder suits, all of which must
be weighed against the cost of potential additional tax liabilities. A
publicly-held corporation whose stock is likely to be traded on a
national exchange, and who is threatened with an "unclean" opin-
ion, probably would prefer to submit to a complete IRS investiga-
tion. This course is the path of least resistance. The board of direc-
tors of a public corporation is unlikely to be willing to inform its
shareholders and the SEC that it withheld vital data or instructed
its accountants not to perform their usual, thorough review be-
cause the board thought the IRS might one day summon the re-
sults. 13 3 A firm of certified public accountants is also unlikely to
aid in this effort, since the accountants themselves face potential
exposure to a variety of civil or criminal sanctions should they fail
to discharge their professional obligations in the proper manner.
To give the IRS access to sensitive accountants' papers is con-
sistent with the policy considerations that are the foundation of
the revenue laws. The audit process ostensibly is a self-critical
search for the truth, which is analogous to the due diligence pro-
cess in public offerings. Public corporations owe equal obligations
of disclosure and candor to their investors, the public, and the IRS
alike. In addition, the Code's reporting requirements are not
subordinate to the disclosure requirements of the securities or
other laws. Indeed, either the SEC or the IRS probably could use
their rulemaking powers to compel the creation and reporting of
tax reserve data or questionable items.134 It is not unreasonable,
132. In early 1981, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' Auditing
Standards Board issued an auditing interpretation on the subject of qualified opinions, see
AICPA STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 31, entitled Evidential Matter. This state-
ment put the profession on notice that auditors are obligated, when free access to records is
impaired, to consider a modification-or even a disclaimer-of the opinion letter. Id. 1 22.
133. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979) ("We do
not doubt that the ability to conduct a confidential investigation would make 'compliance
with the complex laws governing corporate activity' more palatable... ; we do doubt, how-
ever, that a corporation would risk civil or criminal liability under those complex laws by
foregoing introspection.") (citations omitted).
134. See notes 160 & 268 infra.
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therefore, to require the disclosure of all potential items of adjust-
ment, so that the IRS can examine them openly and decide upon
their merits. If a corporation's auditors have discovered an obvious
item of adjustment, the policy of self-reporting dictates that it
should be reported and taxed. If, on the other hand, an item is
questionable, a compromise may be appropriate. Arguable tax con-
sequences should be resolved by negotiation, compromise, or litiga-
tion, not by concealment. Moreover, society generally has signifi-
cant interest in the IRS' auditing major corporations closely and
accurately, with full disclosure a beneficial, not detrimental, means
to this end." 5 The Supreme Court phrased this truth-finding pub-
lic policy in these terms:
[P]ersons summoned as witnesses by competent authority have certain
minimum duties and obligations which are necessary concessions to the pub-
lic interest in the orderly operation of legislative and judicial machinery. A
subpoena has never been treated as an invitation to a game of hare and
hounds, in which the witness must testify only if cornered at the end of the
chase. If that were the case, then, indeed, the great power of testimonial com-
pulsion, so necessary to the effective functioning of courts and legislatures,
would be a nullity. We have often iterated the importance of this public duty,
which every person within the jurisdiction of the Government is bound to
perform when properly summoned.
Certain exemptions from attending or, having attended, giving testimony
are recognized by all courts. But every such exemption is grounded in a sub-
stantial individual interest which has been found, through centuries of expe-
rience, to outweigh the public interest in the search for truth. Dean Wigmore
stated the proposition thus: "For more than three centuries it has now been
recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public ... has a right to every
man's evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of exemption,
we start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give
what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may
exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive
general rule." 13 6
To assign any special significance to the papers at issue in the
reported cases in this area is a product of narrow vision. While the
documents may be sensitive to the accounting profession, they are
135. See generally United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
136. Id. (citations omitted). The "chilling" argument is made in the name of the pub-
lic, but in fact it is an attempt to hide from the public view some private and parochial
concerns, namely, extra taxes owed. Coming from corporations and accountants whose en-
claves in the Internal Revenue Code-special deductions and credits, for example-are firm-
ly fixed, this argument should be viewed with skepticism. Moreover, the public has a very
positive and beneficial interest in complete disclosure of tax-relevant facts, if for no other
reason than that this policy should apply with particular vigor to public corporations, which
are endowed with fewer rights than individuals. The benefits of these tax data seeing the
blue sky of daylight might well "warm," rather than chill, these corporations into fuller
compliance with the tax laws.
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still auditors' work that other auditors-who happen to work for a
governmental auditing agency-are seeking for the purpose of
finding the truth. Indeed, it is not unheard of for IRS agents and
accounting firms' auditors to have had experience in each other's
offices.' Were one auditing firm to succeed another as a corpora-
tion's independent auditor, it would probably be unthinkable to
either firm-or to the client-that these papers would be withheld
from the successor auditors.
What occurs when the IRS summons a taxpayer's or a third
party's documents is merely a variation of a more general fact of
corporate life. Every day a corporation creates business documents
that contain facts, projections, speculation, hearsay, and other as-
sorted data. The corporation's minutes, for example, may encapsu-
late the debate over a potential acquisition, or may recite the "pri-
vate" thoughts of the board of directors about the proper method
of dealing with a large securities liability. Theoretical, speculative
data with tax, securities, environmental, antitrust, and other non-
tax implications are generated daily for normal corporate purposes.
It is axiomatic that data generated for one purpose may be ob-
tained for another, regardless of whether it is by the IRS, another
government agency, or even private litigants. In this sense, tax re-
serve data and reports to management are no different from other
accounting or corporate data. The notion that a government
agency may compel their production, therefore, is not an unreason-
able proposition. Indeed, it may well promote the independent
goals of truth-finding and compliance with all laws-including the
revenue laws.
2. Danger of Outside Disclosure
The second major policy position which the accounting profes-
sion has taken is that tax reserve data and reports to management
might be disclosed to other parties after they are produced to the
IRS-either by negligent IRS personnel or through some compul-
sory process such as a FOIA suit."8 This disclosure would impair
the integrity of the accountants' independent audit function. In
addition, the accountants argue that their clients will be able to
obtain advance knowledge of the audit plan and prepare their
137. See United States v. Riley Co., 45 A.F.T.R. 80-1164 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (mem.) (the
IRS' expert witness had once worked for Arthur Andersen & Co., and while he was there, he
had written portions of some reports to management that the IRS later sought by a sum-
mons), appeal dismissed, No. 80-1124 (7th Cir. Sept. 16, 1980).
138. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
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records accordingly. " "
These arguments have some logical force. Since they are inde-
pendent, a corporation's certified public accountants fulfill a quasi-
adversarial role when they audit the client who pays them. Their
goal is to be detached and objective. If a client knows in advance
the areas on which the accountant intends to concentrate, he
might be able to prepare accordingly and present a deceptive pic-
ture of the corporation's finances.4
Nevertheless, the likelihood that this possibility will ever be-
come a reality is remote. The IRS operates under strict statutory
requirements of nondisclosure,1 41 and civil and criminal penalties
attach to an improper disclosure of "tax return or return informa-
tion."1 4 2 These requirements and potential sanctions create an in-
139. See United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. IM. 1981)
(mem.); United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd, 550
F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
140. This argument assumes that the client will be dishonest in dealings with the ac-
countant. Regardless of the accuracy of this assumption, that the accountants would even
make the argument is in itself noteworthy.
141. I.R.C. §§ 6103, 7213, 7217. Enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 6103
is a complete reversal of prior law, under which tax returns and related data were deemed
public information. See LR.C. § 6103.
142. Section 6103(b) defines these terms as follows:
(1) RETURN.-The term "return" means any tax or information return, declara-
tion of estimated tax, or claim for refund required by, or provided for or permitted
under, the provisions of this title which is filed with the Secretary by, on behalf of, or
with respect to any person, and any amendment or supplement thereto, including sup-
porting schedules, attachments, or lists which are supplemental to, or part of, the re-
turn so filed.
(2) RETURN INFORMATION.-The term "return information" means-
(A) a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments,
receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability,
tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer's
return was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation or process-
ing, or any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or col-
lected by the Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to the determination
of the existence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any per-
son under this title for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition,
or offense, and
(B) any part of any written determination or any background file document re-
lating to such written determination (as such terms are defined in section 6110(b))
which is not open to public inspection under section 6110,
but such term does not include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or
otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.
(3) TAXPAYER RETURN INFORMATION.-The term "taxpayer return infor-
mation" means return information as defined in paragraph (2) which is filed with, or
furnished to, the Secretary by or on behalf of the taxpayer to whom such return infor-
mation relates.
I.R.C. § 6103(b). These definitions essentially are very broad; they cover virtually anything
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centive to IRS agents not to make improper disclosures. Moreover,
it is not appropriate to assume that these disclosures would take
place; the evidence indicates that the IRS takes seriously its legal
obligation to guard against the improper disclosure of tax data cov-
ered by nondisclosure statutes.14
The argument that accountants' papers obtained by the IRS
are subject to FOIA depends upon a liberal construction of that act
and two basic assumptions. First, one must assume that a tax-
payer, the taxpayer's competitor, or some other interested
nontaxpayer would pursue a FOIA request to litigation and a judg-
ment. A corporate rival or shareholder may have such an incentive,
but a taxpayer likely would not. It would be disingenuous for a
taxpayer to litigate successfully a FOIA claim for tax reserve data
and then claim in a later suit that the IRS should be denied access
to such information in the future because the audit process had
been undermined. Moreover, under FOIA, a nontaxpayer may not
obtain a taxpayer's data.
1 44
Second, one must assume that FOIA would permit disclosure
of tax reserve data in the Service's possession. The Act provides a
disclosure exemption, which is subject to certain conditions, for in-
formation that another statute specifically immunizes from disclo-
sure.1 45 The trend of decisions now is to deny disclosure of
data-even to the taxpayers themselves-when the Secretary de-
termines pursuant to section 6103(e)(6) of the Internal Revenue
Code that disclosure would "seriously impair" federal tax adminis-
tration.146 In Zale Corp. v. United States Internal Revenue Ser-
vice,1 47 for example, the district court held that section 6103(e)(6)
is a specific exemption that Congress had contemplated when it
enacted FOIA, and that material which is not obtainable under
that is brought to the attention of IRS personnel. Clearly, tax reserve data and reports to
management fall into this category.
143. United States v. Chemical Bank, 593 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1979) (the court will pre-
sume that the IRS adheres to the strictures of I.R.C. § 6103). See also United States v.
Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 415 F.2d 1284 (6th Cir. 1969) (a presumption of regularity and in-
tegrity attends IRS investigations). Section 6103 states that, except for the narrowly defined
exceptions in § 6103(d) and § 6103(f)-(o), only the taxpayer himself, his designee, or a
closely related person with a "material interest" may see a taxpayer's return. I.R.C. §
6103(c), (e). Return information is not open even to these persons unless the Secretary of
the Treasury "determines that such disclosure would not seriously impair federal tax ad-
ministration." I.R.C. § 6103(c).
144. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976); I.R.C. § 6103(a).
145. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
146. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(6).
147. 481 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1979).
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section 6103, therefore, cannot be obtained under FOIA. The de-
termination in Zale is entirely appropriate for those examinations
that are still in progress, as well as for those that already are com-
pleted, if disclosure might affect future audits.14 s The latter of
these two situations is precisely what the accounting profession
contends are the circumstances in tax reserve cases.
The FOIA exemption, contained in section 552(b)(4) of U.S.C.
Title 5, generally forbids disclosure of either matters that are trade
secrets or financial information obtained from another party which
is privileged or confidential. 14 The claims made in Arthur Ander-
sen, Arthur Young, and Coopers & Lybrand that tax reserve data
and reports to management are confidential would appear to sat-
isfy the exemption's confidentiality requirement.1 50 The term "con-
fidential" has been interpreted to mean "customarily not. . . re-
leased to the public by the person from whom it was obtained."'
This test, at least initially, is an objective one; it is subjective only
to the extent that the court considers the legislative purpose of
FOIA.152 That purpose supports a finding of confidentiality if dis-
closure would have the effect of impairing the government's ability
to obtain the necessary information in the future, or if it would
cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person
from whom the data were obtained.15 The accountants in fact
have tried to persuade courts with variations of both of these pro-
positions in the tax reserve cases.1"
148. For the most part, courts have followed Zale. See, e.g., Breuhaus v. Internal Rev-
enue Service, 609 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1979); Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 838 n.33 (5th
Cir. 1979); Cal-Am Corp. v. Internal Revenue Service, 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1576 (C.D. Cal.
1980); Wolfe v. Internal Revenue Service, 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1565 (D. Colo. 1980); Kanter v.
Internal Revenue Service, 496 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. IM. 1980); Schottenstein v. Commis-
sioner, 39 A.F.T.R.2d 77-786 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
149. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976).
150. The information clearly appears to be "commercial or financial" in nature within
the meaning of the FOIA. Id.
151. National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (quoting S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965)).
152. Id. at 766-77; accord, Board of Trade v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
627 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see H. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966); S. REP.
No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965); cf. Murphy v. Department of Army, 613 F.2d 1151
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (exemption five of FOIA must be considered in light of congressional
intent).
153. National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (mem.); United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), a/I'd,
550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
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In sum, a nontaxpayer cannot obtain data through a FOIA
suit, and a taxpayer is not likely to try; if a taxpayer did try, how-
ever, the exemptions contained in sections 552(b)(3) and (b)(4) of
the Act, read together with section 6103 of the Internal Revenue
Code, suggest that the attempt would not be successful. Thus, the
policy concerns of the profession about the leakage of produced
data and restricted communication which accountants claim justify
nondisclosure, are lacking in substance. The independent audit
process, even if it is somewhat chilled by the threat of disclosure,
will continue to an extent that is acceptable to various regulatory
agencies and the corporation's stockholders. Finally, other federal
statutes do not imperil data's secrecy once it is turned over to the
Service.
3. Expectation of Confidentiality
The accounting profession's third major policy argument is
that courts should recognize an expectation of confidentiality and
privacy between accountant and client1 55 because of their special
relationship and the intimate financial knowledge that the latter
routinely makes available to the former.156 The decision in Powell,
however, preempted any suggestion that the summons power is
subject to the fourth amendment probable cause requirement, 57
and Couch rejected the concept of an accountant-client privi-
lege.158 The accountants' argument, therefore, can only be valid as
a balancing of policy considerations that does not rely-at least
explicitly-upon the fourth amendment's "zone of privacy"
concept.
15'
155. See cases cited notes 1 & 3 supra. The accountants in United States v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), afl'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977), pressed this
argument strongly before the district court.
156. See generally Ritholz, supra note 114.
157. See notes 62-66 supra and accompanying text.
158. See notes 105-10 supra and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penum-
bras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.").
Nevertheless, the accountants' objective clearly is the recognition of what amounts to
an accountant-client privilege by some other name. Some suggestion can be found in the
cases that their goal is a variation on the work product doctrine that is less than a privilege,
but which only a showing of substantial need-such as the likely presence of fraud-can
overcome. Why fraudulent acts, whether they are civil or criminal, should rank above the
collection of revenue in the hierarchy of "need" is not clear. Moreover, the Supreme Court
has recognized the "inherently intertwined" nature of the dual purposes of I.R.C. § 7602,
which are to discover civil as well as criminal liability. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank,
437 U.S. 298 (1978). The Court in LaSalle made no distinction between these "normally
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Couch also vitiated any argument that clients or accountants
are reasonably entitled to a subjective expectation of confidential-
ity, at least concerning the usual type of accounting records. More-
over, the SEC can require the generation and disclosure of tax re-
serve data,16 0 which further vitiates any subjective expectation of
confidentiality argument. Whether policy considerations justify a
finding of an objective privacy expectation, however, is both one of
the foremost issues in this area and a somewhat more complex
question.
The tax reserve and reports to management cases decided thus
far, however, have rejected this proposition. In Arthur Young, for
example, the court specifically noted the absence of an accountant-
client privilege.161 Although the client may surrender potential tax
reserve data with the expectation that the data will remain confi-
dential, this expectation is not legitimate vis-a-vis the IRS, which
any client knows can always compel the production of both data
that underlie the tax returns and specific payments that the tax-
payer made. This compelled production may occur regardless of
whether the data is in fact reflected on the return.1 62 Moreover, the
court in Arthur Andersen saw no difference between the objective
expectation of confidentiality argument and the accountant-client
privilege concept that the Court in Couch rejected.163 Finally, the
district court case of Price Waterhouse, in which Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion, the audited taxpayer, attempted to intervene and oppose an
inseparable" goals, nor have other courts since LaSalle. See, e.g., United States v. Garden
State Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1979).
160. Regulation S-X, "Form and Content of and Requirements for Financial State-
ments, Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935, Investment Company Act of 1940, and Energy Policy and Conservation
Act of 1975," generally describes the categories of financial reporting the SEC requires pur-
suant to its rule-making powers. 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (1981).
161. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
162. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). A line of authority, which
is similar to Couch's holding that accountants have no justifiable expectation of privacy in
accounting records, stands for the proposition that the filing of a tax return is a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege concerning both the disclosed items and other information that
is reasonably related thereto. See, e.g., United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490 (N.D.N.Y. 1969). But see Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963). The cases appear to be
in accord with the notion that if data is found as a fact to have been prepared with the
intention-or even the possibility-that it will be disclosed in some form, a person cannot
reasonably expect it to be confidential when the IRS subsequently makes a demand for
disclosure.
163. United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 326-27 (D. Mass.
1979), appeal of one party dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1021 (1980), aff'd as to second party, 623 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1980).
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IRS summons to the respondent accounting firm for tax reserve
data, is another example of the courts' unwillingness to accept the
newest confidentiality proposition."" In denying intervention, the
court reasoned that Gulf had no recognizable legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy that would permit intervention, since it had for-
feited all confidentiality when it turned its own material over to
the accountants.16
The unifying, albeit unarticulated, theme in all these cases is
that certified public accountants-particularly accountants for
large, publicly held corporations-have a quasi-public stature and
function that is inconsistent with claims of secrecy in accountant-
client relations. While these corporations' financial affairs may be
kept secret from the world at large, this privacy must give way to
the demands of revenue collection or other public reporting
obligations.
Accountants traditionally have assumed this quasi-public, in-
dependent role, and assumed it proudly. Thus, accountants do not
perform audits for the corporate leadership alone. The sharehold-
ers, for example, have a legitimate, protectable interest in strict
corporate financial accountability.1" Customers also occasionally
may impose audit accountability on a corporation through their re-
sponses in the marketplace or in private suits.1 67 In addition, agen-
cies such as the SEC impose a myriad of financial accounting re-
quirements for the protection of investors. Indeed, the rules of
both the SEC and the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants (AICPA) require public disclosure of material financial
events and subsequent qualifications of an audited financial state-
ment.168 Thus, the transactions that are explored in tax reserve
164. United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-1005 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
165. Id. at 76-1006. See also In re Co-Build Cos., 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-308 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
166. See Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905); State ex rel. Dixon v. Missouri-
Kansas Pipe Line Co., 42 Del. 423, 36 A.2d 29 (1944). See generally, Annot., 22 A.L.R. 24
(1923). These interests are based upon the principles that as the owners, the shareholders
have a right to know their corporation's affairs, and that the officers and directors have a
corresponding fiduciary and agency obligation to keep the shareholders informed. See also
Apple v. Careerco, Inc., 82 Misc. 2d 468, 370 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1974) (shareholder entitled to
see corporate financial statements); Lake v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 2 Ohio St. 2d 101,
206 N.E.2d 566 (1965).
167. See National Bank v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 157 Cal. 573, 108 P. 676 (1910). See
generally Annot., 149 A.L.R. 787 (1944) (trust fund theory of liability).
168. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976), requires corpo-
rations subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 to submit to
the SEC periodic reports that disclose such information as the Commission may require.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1980). Form 8-K is used for current reports, 17 C.F.R. §
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data and reports to management quite conceivably could find their
way into these publicly required statements.""'
The tax laws and their interpretations impose further record-
keeping requirements on businesses. Section 6001 of the Code, for
example, provides that every taxpayer must keep such records and
render such reports as will clearly reflect his income.1 70 The appli-
cable Treasury Regulations (Regulations) require that these
records be made available to the IRS at reasonable times. 7 More-
over, the Code and Regulations abound with similar reporting and
disclosure requirements whose nature and complexity implicitly
contemplate the assistance of accountants.7 The accounting pro-
fession itself has adopted rules that stress the auditor's indepen-
dent and quasi-public "watchdog" role. 17  Thus, the litigating
stance taken by the accountants-that some type of privilege
should be recognized in order to keep sacrosanct the auditor's in-
dependence and the profession's methods, results, and secrets-is
inconsistent with its generally accepted role as something much
more than the mere tool of its client. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court's denial of an accountant privilege in Couch can in part be
attributed to a recognition of these aspects of the accountant's role
and stature. The privacy notions that accompany financial transac-
tions thus have only limited application, since virtually all
financial transactions carry potential tax consequences, and since
the client engages the accountant with either actual or constructive
knowledge of the latter's quasi-public function.
1 74
In addition, the accountant faces a potential threat of personal
240.13a-11 (1980), and annual reports are made on Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1980).
The AICPA has also promulgated rules on this subject. See FASB STATEMENT No. 5.
169. If, for example, the corporation either had maintained significant "off-the-book"
funds or had deducted foreign bribes, kickbacks, and the like, these transactions might re-
quire both disclosure in a 10-K report, see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981),
and the accrual of extra amounts for the contingent tax exposure incurred.
170. I.R.C. § 6001.
171. Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(e) (1978); Treas. Reg. § 31.6001-1(d) (1960); Treas. Reg.
8 53.6001-1(c) (1975); Treas. Reg. § 55.6601-1(c) (1981).
172. See I.R.C. §§ 6011, 6012, 6013, 6015, 6017, 6031, 6032, 6033, 6034, 6035, 6037,
6038, 6039, 6041, 6060 and Treasury Regulations thereunder.
173. The accountant, for example, may have duties to alert his client about potential
problems, to correct or disclose errors, or to impose restrictions or qualifications on his opin-
ion letter. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.21, .22, .51 (1980). The AICPA's canons of ethics are also
explicit on these points. 2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS (CCH) ET § 54.
174. Not surprisingly, the courts have been reluctant to decide favorably upon the
certified public accountants' assertions of privacy interests, since the Supreme Court has
held that their clients themselves-the major publicly held corporations-have assumed a
quasi-public status. See notes 166-67 & 191-99 infra and accompanying text.
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liability for failure to adhere to his public responsibilities. An ac-
countant cannot be asked to keep confidential, in the name of pro-
fessionalism, the very information that will protect him against a
charge that strikes at the heart of his professional reputation. In
1973 the Supreme Court in Couch referred to the accountants' re-
alistic fear of prosecution for preparing a false return.17 5 This
threat has increased exponentially in recent years in the face of a
long list of potential civil and criminal liabilities.17 6 The Supreme
Court's belief in Couch that personal exposure to liability detracts
from the accountant's expectation of privacy'"7 thus has become
particularly relevant. Therefore, corporate public disclosure re-
sponsibilities, which are fulfilled by accountants whose exposure
has vastly increased, argue even more strongly for the nonrecogni-
tion of an accountant's expectation of confidentiality in tax reserve
and management report files.
Unquestionably, a tension exists in the accounting profession
between its duty to the client and its quasi-public function. Never-
theless, the policy considerations that an expectation of confidenti-
ality would further do not command a great deal of logical or expe-
riential force. On the other hand, several considerations favor
disclosure.
4. Prodisclosure Policies
The policy considerations favoring the Service's position di-
rectly contravene the accountants' arguments against disclosure.
These policies stem from a tension between two inconsistent prem-
ises: While the Supreme Court has stated that the collection of the
revenue is the "life-blood of government, ' 178 the primary-and oc-
casionally exclusive-source of tax data is the often reluctant tax-
payer himself.17 9 In addition, a third proposition must be consid-
ered, namely, that the assessment and collection of revenue are
usually accomplished at the administrative level.
(a) Administrative Agency Policies in General
Administrative agency investigations in general-and IRS au-
dits in particular-proceed under a set of rules and a code of val-
175. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
176. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
177. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
178. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
179. See United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Il. 1972), aff'd as modified,
478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973).
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ues materially different from those operating in civil or criminal
litigation. For example, no complaint, answer, indictment, or dis-
covery is necessary in an administrative investigation. An audit or
investigation may begin through a routine tax return check, an in-
formation item, a computer run, or an informant's tip. Because the
probe is inquisitorial rather than accusatorial, the investigation is
broad in scope, with the issues sometimes only vaguely defined.
Disputes over discoverability and admissibility that are so common
in litigation are inappropriate and do not often arise."s' Moreover,
in IRS and other agency investigations, the taxpayer or other sub-
ject of scrutiny is usually in control of the facts."'
Because of these differences from formal civil litigation, in
which equal opportunity for both parties is paramount, Congress
has structured,182 and the courts have endorsed,183 an asymmetry
of interests in IRS and other agency inquiries. As the Supreme
Court stated in Powell, the audit, revenue, or special agent may
investigate a taxpayer because the law is violated, or merely be-
cause he wants assurance that it is not."" Moreover, the Service
may inquire into any matter that might affect either the amount of
a taxpayer's liability or the correctness of his tax return-limited
only by a few constitutional and other broadly construed statutory
180. As the court stated in In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hosp., 209 F.2d 122 (2d
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954):
Such investigatory inquiry by a Government agent is not a judicial proceeding ...
Even administrative agencies like the Federal Trade Commission, the Labor Board and
the Interstate Commerce Commission have never been restricted by the rigid rules of
evidence applicable in courts of law. . . . [T]here is even less reason to restrict the
revenue agent's inquiry by technical rules of evidence.
Id. at 123 (footnote and citations omitted).
181. United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. IlM. 1972), a/I'd as modified, 478
F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973).
182. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1976); National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (1976).
183. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); FTC v. Cement Inst.,
333 U.S. 683 (1948); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); ICC v. Baird,
194 U.S. 25 (1904); EEOC v. University of N.M., Albuquerque, 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir.
1974) (only limitation on Commission's power under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1964), is
whether data sought is relevant and competent).
The Noall court arguably referred to this distinction between court and agency process
when it distinguished the cases that the taxpayer cited to show the inhibiting effect of com-
pelled disclosure. The court noted that these cases were factually distinguishable and arose
in the course of civil discovery. It then stated that, "[w]ith respect to enforcement of the tax
laws, Congress itself has decided the policy issue, and it is not for the courts to challenge
that determination. In this, as in many other procedural questions, the collection of the
revenue stands apart." United States v. NoalU, 587 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 923 (1979).




The concept of a legitimate congressional delegation of vast
enforcement powers to administrative agencies, while not initially
popular, 8e has been firmly fixed for many years. The Supreme
Court in 1946 harmonized a series of partly conflicting precedents
in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling 87 when it held that
the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Depart-
ment of Labor had the power to compel, by administrative sub-
poena, the production of compliance reports pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act.188 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit 89 had ruled that the agency lacked subpoena power absent a
showing of probable cause under the fourth amendment. The Su-
preme Court rejected both this notion and its corollary that a con-
trary rule would permit "general fishing expeditions into petition-
ers' books, records and papers, in order to secure evidence that
they have violated the Act, without a prior charge or complaint
and simply to secure information upon which to base one. .. .
The Court reasoned that the subpoena does not amount to a tradi-
tional search and seizure, since it neither entails an entry nor a
non-consensual search or seizure. The Court then stated that in
balancing private against public interests at the administrative
level, a court should give less deference to a corporation than to an
individual, a rule of particular significance for custodians of tax
reserve data. Unlike individuals, the Court noted, corporations his-
torically have been subject to the "broad visitorial power" 19 1 of the
state. Under this view, if the inquiry is otherwise statutorily au-
thorized, and the data sought are relevant,192 the fourth amend-
185. The fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause, for example, applies to civil pro-
ceedings, McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924); and to the summons power, United
States v. Slutsky, 352 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), as does the attorney-client privilege
and work product doctrine. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). See also
I.R.C. §§ 7603, 7605 & 7609.
186. See, e.g., FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1924) (overbroad
subpoena); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (illegal search
and seizure).
187. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
188. Ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 &
Supp. HI 1979)). Section 11(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976), endows investigators
with authority, and § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 209 (1976), incorporates the subpoena power language of
§§ 9 and 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 50-51 (1914).
189. 147 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1945), afl'd, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
190. 327 U.S. 186, 195 (1946).
191. Id. at 204.
192. The Court in Oklahoma Press stated,
It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint
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ment, if applicable at all, 19 3 at most guards against a traditional
illegal search and seizure or an overbroad, vague, or indefinite
subpoena.
The Supreme Court extended even further the proposition
that administrative agency jurisdiction entails inquisitorial powers
in United States v. Morton Salt Co. 194 In proceedings under sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act'95 seeking an order
compelling Morton Salt to cease and desist from certain pricing,
production, and marketing practices, the FTC, as part of its deci-
sion, directed the company to create1 98 additional, highly particu-
larized reports that would demonstrate compliance with the cease
and desist order. The company refused, and the Court upheld the
Commission's power to compel these reports through a mandatory
injunction. In so doing, the Court expressly relegated corporations
to a status inferior to that enjoyed by individuals with respect to
fourth amendment privacy rights.197 The Court noted that corpora-
tions are endowed with public attributes, that they have a collec-
tive impact on society, and that they exist solely at the sufferance
of society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artifi-
cial entities.198 The Court went on to state that
[e]ven if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused
by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies
have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consis-
tent with the law and the public interest.
- [I]t is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency,
the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably
relevant. 99
The "official curiosity" standard-an outgrowth of the Court's
of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough
that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, within the power of Con-
gress to command.
Id. at 208-09.
193. Compare Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), and
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) with G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338
(1977).
194. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
195. Ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979)).
196. The creation of data has never been urged as a component of the summons
power. See United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980).
197. 338 U.S. at 652. See also United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905) (corporations are sub-
ject to visitorial power of state).
198. 338 U.S. at 652.
199. Id. at 652.
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rejection of the probable cause standard-was extended to the
summons power in Powell.200 The Court thus implied that the ad-
ministrative nature of an IRS examination requires that the Ser-
vice proceed under standards of inquiry that are identical to the
ones which other administrative agencies follow. Moreover, in one
of its most recent pronouncements on the summons power, the
Court in Euge expanded the applicability of the Powell decision
perhaps to the furthest practical extent when it held that the sum-
mons power is available "absent express statutory prohibition or
substantial countervailing policies."' 0 1
(b) Policies Underlying the Revenue Laws
The Service's statutory authority and obligation to audit is
embodied in section 7601 of the Code.20 This section instructs the
Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate, "to the extent he deems
it practicable," to cause Treasury Department officers or employ-
ees to "proceed. .. and inquire after and concerning all persons
therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax."'' The
summons power serves to implement this statutory mandate for
four named purposes: To ascertain the correctness of a return, to
make a return when none has been made, to determine the liability
of any person for any internal revenue tax, and to collect any inter-
nal revenue tax.204
The courts often have endorsed 2 5 these wide-ranging powers
of inquiry in decisions that bear the imprint of four distinct policy
propositions: (1) Access to information promotes justice in admin-
istrative proceedings; (2) powerful weapons are necessary to assure
the integrity and equity of the tax system; (3) the IRS requires a
broad mandate and powerful tools of inquiry to accomplish its
task; and (4) the IRS cannot know at the outset of an investigation
the importance or relevance of all the documents it seeks-or
sometimes even what data to seek-since the taxpayer typically is
200. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
201. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 711 (1980). The Euge standard comports
with the standard applicable to the subpoena power of the SEC. See SEC v. Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 482 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1979); 15 U.S.C. § 79r(c) (1976). See also
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S. 33 (1917); Harriman v. ICC,
211 U.S. 407 (1908); Top Value Meats Inc. v. FTC, 586 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1978).
202. I.R.C. § 7601.
203. Id.
204. Id. § 7602.
205. See, e.g., United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980); United States v. Bisceglia,
420 U.S. 141 (1975); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
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in control of the facts.208
The first policy-access to information promotes jus-
tice-simply recognizes that in administrative and adversarial set-
tings, the law is entitled to every person's evidence, or, as one court
has stated in the grand jury context, that all citizens have a
"strong obligation" to furnish all relevant evidence.20 7 This general
policy of antipathy toward concealing the truth applies to the ad-
ministrative and litigative stages of a dispute, as well as to many
types of regulatory agencies, including the IRS.20 8 In addition, the
need for a policy of open-ended truth-finding at the administrative
level may be even greater when the nature of the inquiry is private
and relatively informal, the issues at least initially are not precisely
defined, and the outcome theoretically may even benefit the inves-
tigated party. This policy is so firmly embedded in the law that it
ought to weigh heavily in any decision on the availability of
accountants' workpapers, particularly since the courts generally do
not recognize an accountant-client privilege or even quasi-
privilege.20 9
The second and third policy principles are interrelated. They
both assume that government cannot function without an effective
tax system, 210 and that if the system is to maintain its effectiveness
and treat all taxpayers equitably, the IRS must be given appropri-
ately coercive tools. To create an island of secrecy by permitting
accountants and their clients to preserve the confidentiality of tax
reserve data and reports to management would offend the princi-
ple of equity, since other tax entities and individual taxpayers can-
not claim the same privilege. In fact, the perceived fairness of the
taxing system would be enhanced to the extent that courts refused
to sanction special interests in the audit process. All other taxpay-
ers are required to disclose tax-related data to the IRS, and the
Supreme Court often has stated that corporations have lesser, not
206. See United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd as modified,
478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973).
207. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 483 F. Supp. 1085, 1089 (D. Minn.
1979), stay granted, 483 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Minn. 1979); accord, United States v. Bremicker,
365 F. Supp. 701 (D. Minn. 1973) (duty to obey summons). The Supreme Court repeatedly
has endorsed this general principle, even over the objections of the President of the United
States. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
208. See notes 183-201 supra and accompanying text; note 69 supra.
209. See notes 105-15 & 155-77 supra and accompanying text.
210. See generally Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935); Phillips v. Commis-
sioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
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greater, rights than individuals. 11 Moreover, this lack of secrecy
would not result in a significant impairment of the accountant's
independent audit process;212 data that taxpayers and accountants
create for other, supervening legal reasons more than likely will
survive the threat of summons, particularly when only money-not
the life of the corporation-is at stake.
The fourth policy recognizes that in IRS investigations-like
most agency inquiries-the facts usually are within the virtually
exclusive control of the investigated party.213 If, for example, the
IRS examines the taxpayer's reserve to determine whether to disal-
low a bad debt deduction, the taxpayer himself is the source of the
facts concerning the collectibility of those debts. This problem be-
comes acute in large-case examinations. Major corporations tend to
have tens of thousands of accounts, millions of documents, and
hundreds of corporate auditors, while the number of IRS agents
that are assigned to audit these corporations typically is fewer than
ten.214 Recognizing the gamesmanship that unfortunately attends
IRS audits, courts generally have attempted to balance this dispar-
ity by defining the scope of the IRS compulsory process broadly.
2 15
All of these policy considerations, of course, are interrelated
and mutually reinforcing. The importance of revealing the truth in
tax investigations reinforces the extra latitude that Congress and
the courts have granted to the IRS when the truth resides in the
taxpayer's control. Similarly, the high priority that society gives to
211. Moreover, corporations are also the entities who more than likely have the most
to hide-and thus to lose-from disclosure. They invoke the name of the public for a pri-
vate purpose, which is to avoid paying more taxes. These corporations suggest, somewhat
incredibly, that if the IRS obtains access to tax reserve data, they will be tempted to waiver
in their compliance with other laws. In the post-Watergate era, the response to these argu-
ments should be that the public interest lies in full disclosure-not in secrecy-and that
public policy considerations do not entail picking and choosing among equally important
lawful obligations.
212. See notes 119-33 supra and accompanying text.
213. See United States v. Riley Co., 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-1164, 1165 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(mem.), appeal dismissed, No. 80-1124 (7th Cir. Sept. 16, 1980). The Court in Riley noted
that the IRS could not be expected to know for certain what the summoned reports to
management contained without seeing them first. Accord, United States v. Acker, 325 F.
Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In Riley, however, the Government did come close to acquiring
this prior knowledge. The summons called for the production of "bluebacks," which are
reports to management, that Arthur Andersen & Co. had prepared. The Government's ex-
pert witness, an Internal Revenue Agent, had previously worked for Arthur Andersen and
had written portions of the same type bluebacks.
214. See United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), afi'd,
550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
215. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
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the collection of revenue necessitates a rapid and effective enforce-
ment machinery. Finally, the policy that the efficacy and legiti-
macy of the tax system's quasi-voluntary, self-assessment nature
depends upon the equitable treatment of all taxpayers-that each
pays his fair share-requires that the enforcement process reach
the large and small taxpayer alike.
The centrality of these themes to the integrity of the entire
taxing system contrasts sharply with the correspondingly narrow
focus of an accountant's interests in protecting tax reserve data.
Indeed, to balance the two interests against one another effectively
decides the issue in favor of the IRS, a result which the case law
thus far would support. This balancing, therefore, should continue
to result in the disclosure of accountants' sensitive workpapers to
the IRS.
To recapitulate, the policy arguments should be resolved as
follows: (1) No accountant-client privilege exists; (2) neither the
corporation nor the accountant should be entitled to either a sub-
jective or a legitimate objective expectation of privacy; and (3) ac-
countants will continue to create tax reserve data, in spite of the
threat that it might be disclosed to the IRS. On the other hand,
the policy considerations that favor the disclosure of accountants'
sensitive workpapers are significant and can be enumerated as fol-
lows: (1) Tax reserve data and reports to management are highly
useful and relevant to IRS investigations; (2) auditing major corpo-
rations is arduous without the taxpayer's cooperation; (3) ascer-
tainment of the truth is a desirable goal; (4) effective enforcement
tools are necessary to accomplish this goal; (5) the facts needed in
an investigation are typically within the taxpayer's control; (6) all
taxpayers should receive equitable and equal treatment; and (7)
swift and effective revenue collection is a high priority national
goal. Thus, it is little wonder that the court in Noal concluded
that Congress had already decided the policy issues surrounding
the confidentiality of accountants' papers when it enacted section
7602,216 and that all which remained for a court to decide was
whether the data were "relevant.
2 17
C. "Other Data" Argument
Perhaps because of their lack of success with the relevance
216. See notes 116-17 supra and accompanying text.
217. United States v. NoaH, 587 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
923 (1979).
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and policy arguments, accountants and their clients appear to be
developing a third litigating position: Tax reserve data and reports
to management reflect opinions, judgments, and projections that
are not "other data" within the meaning of section 7602.218 This
position has been litigated only once, and the court rejected it,2 19
in part on the ground that section 7602 is to be liberally construed
and that any interpretative restriction on otherwise relevant and
summonable data should not be sanctioned.22 °
The "other data" argument would interpret section 7602's
phrase "books, papers, records" and the undefined term "other
data" somewhat narrowly. The predecessor to section 7602 pro-
vided for the summoning of "books, papers, records or memo-
randa, 221 and this language was carried forward through succes-
sive revenue acts until the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.22 The
companion federal court jurisdictional statute provided for juris-
diction to enforce a summons for "books, papers, or other data, '223
218. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. It will be recalled that § 7602 autho-
rizes the Secretary to use the summons power "[t]o examine any books, papers, records, or
other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry." I.R.C. § 7602(1) (emphasis
supplied). See also Caplin, supra note 36. Caplin recites this proposition as part of the
AICPA's position. The initial problem with this concept is that it may be irrelevant that the
tax reserve file and reports to management may not qualify as "other data" under I.R.C. §
7602, since it seems all too obvious that they are at least records and papers.
219. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
220. Id. at 1159.
221. Act of February 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 1305, 40 Stat. 1057. The statute was codified
as section 3614(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and provided,
The Commissioner, for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return or for
the purpose of making a return where none has been made, is authorized, by any officer
or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, including the field service, designated
by him for that purpose, to examine any books, papers, records, or memoranda bearing
upon the matters required to be included in the return, and may require the attend-
ance of the person rendering the return or of any officer or employee of such person, or
the attendance of any other person having knowledge in the premises, and may take
his testimony with reference to the matters required by law to be included in such
return, with power to administer oaths to such person or persons.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 39, § 3614(a), 53 Stat. 1 (current version at I.R.C. § 7602).
222. Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 852, § 618, 45 Stat. 791; Act of February 26, 1926, ch. 27,
§ 1104, 44 Stat., pt. 2, at 9; Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 1004, 43 Stat. 253; Act of Nov-
ember 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 1308, 42 Stat. 227. This provision eventually became § 3614(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 34, § 3614(a), 53 Stat. 1
(current version at I.R.C. § 7602); see note 221 supra. See generally United States v. Camp-
bell, 524 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1975); Brownson v. United States, 32 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1929);
Brief for Respondent at 42-48, United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980).
223. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 34, § 3633(a), 53 Stat. 1 (current version at I.R.C. §
7604(a)). Section 3633(a) provided,
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or
to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States for the
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which indicated that Congress was using the terms "memoranda"
and "other data" interchangeably.22 4 Thus, the 1954 Code revisions
provided no "material" change in substituting the term "other
data" for "memoranda" in section 7602.225 The legislative history is
otherwise silent on whether Congress intended "other data" to be
restricted to hard numbers and facts, or whether it meant for the
phrase to include judgments, evaluation, opinions, and speculation,
which is the type of material available from tax reserve files and
reports to management.
Few courts have addressed the issue of the meaning of "other
data," but the reported cases appear consistent with the liberal
construction and wide latitude typically given to the summons
power.22 6 In Davey the Second Circuit upheld enforcement of a
summons for original computer tapes belonging to Continental In-
surance Company that recorded and summarized expenses, in-
come, and losses.2 2 In rejecting Continental's argument that the
magnetic tapes were not books, records, papers, or other data, the
court stated that
[s]ection 7602 is intended to allow the IRS access to all relevant or mate-
rial records and data in the taxpayer's possession. It places no limit or condi-
tion on the type or form of the medium by which the record subject to sum-
mons is kept and nothing in the language or background suggests that such a
limitation was intended. The purpose was to enable the IRS to get at the
taxpayer's records, in whatever form they might be kept. The standard is not
district in which such person resides shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to
compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data.
Id. This statute likewise had undergone successive enactments. See, e.g., Act of May 29,
1928, ch. 852, § 617(a), 45 Stat. 791; Act of December 16, 1926, ch. 27, § 1122(a), 44 Stat., pt.
2, at 1; Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 234, § 1025(a), 43 Stat. 253; Act of November 23, 1921, ch.
136, § 1305, 42 Stat. 227; see Brownson v. United States, 32 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1929).
224. The other antecedents of § 7602 were §§ 3615 and 3654 of the 1939 Code. Section
3615(a) provided in part,
It shall be lawful for the collector, subject to the provisions of this section to sum-
mon any person to appear before him and produce books at a time and place named in
the summons, and to give testimony or answer interrogatories, under oath, respecting
any objects or income subject to tax or the returns thereof.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 39, § 3615(a), 53 Stat. 1 (current version at I.R.C. § 7602).
225. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A436 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 617 (1954); HousE WAYS AND MEANS Comm., D-TAiLED DISCUSSION OF TECH-
NICAL PROVISIONS OF [H.R. 8300], 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG.
& Aum. NEws 4584.
226. See United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Brown,
349 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ill. 1972), afl'd as modified, 478 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1973).
227. United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976). See notes 98-103 supra and
accompanying text. An employer is required to keep these records. See Trees. Reg. § 1.6001-
1(e) (1959). Under the regulations, a limited class of records can be stored on magnetic tape.
Rev. Rul. 71-20, 1971-1 C.B. 392.
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the form of the record but whether it might shed light on the accuracy of the
taxpayer's returns.
2 28
In a series of cases that culminated with the Supreme Court's
decision in Euge,222 various district courts and courts of appeals
had addressed the issue whether handwriting exemplars are "other
data" and thus subject to the summons power.230 The court in
United States v. Brown81 held in the negative and reasoned that
the summons power reaches only data that are actually in exis-
tence; since the handwriting exemplars in Brown were not in exis-
tence, they were not "other data." Some courts have also formu-
lated an additional rationale for denying enforcement in these
cases that derives from the doctrine of ejusdem generis2 s These
courts have held that "other data" must be defined by reference to
the class represented by its companions: "books, papers, records."
Since the giving of handwriting exemplars is clearly not within
that class, the courts have reasoned that the exemplars cannot be
"other data."
These precedents imply that data which is "in existence"
qualify as "other data," at least when they fall within the class of
books, papers, and records. Under this reasoning, no distinction
exists between papers that contain facts and those that do not; a
paper's relevance, rather than its form, governs whether it qualifies
as "other data." This interpretation is in accordance with the well-
established general principle that the summons power reaches any
material that is not specifically exempted.233 Moreover, it is consis-
tent with other cases that uphold the summons power for records
such as valuation reports that express opinions rather than detail
facts.
2 34
228. United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d at 999.
229. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980); see notes 69 & 201 supra and accom-
panying text.
230. See United States v. Rosinsky, 547 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Brown, 536 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hoopingarner, 438 F. Supp. 366
(N.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Campbell, 390 F. Supp. 711 (D.S.D. 1975), aff'd in part,
524 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1975).
231. 536 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1976).
232. See Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 553-54 (1923).
233. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 711 (1980). The dictionary definition gives
the common meaning of the term "data" and states that it includes organized information
collected for a specific purpose. BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 356 (5th ed. 1979). Such a broad
reading almost certainly would include opinions and speculations.
234. United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967) (engineer's valuation re-
port); accord, United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Il. 1981)




Consideration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in this
analysis is also helpful.2 5 Rule 26(b)(1)2 86 provides that parties
may obtain discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." The
other provisions of rule 26 allow for the discovery of trial prepara-
tion materials23 7 and experts' opinions-whether or not the experts
are retained in anticipation of litigation.23 8 Furthermore, even the
work product of lawyers is not absolutely excluded from civil
discovery.23 9
A close analogy exists between tax reserve files and reports to
management on the one hand, and discoverable experts' opinons
on the other. The accountants, whether they are independent or
internal, function as experts240 who evaluate raw data and form an
opinion that is based upon established criteria-the tax law and
GAAP. Thus, a tax reserve summons seeks material that would not
be immunized from discovery in civil litigation on the ground that
it contains opinions, evaluations, or conclusions. For example, if
the shareholders in a shareholder's derivative suit sought discovery
of the auditor's opinions and evaluations, rule 26 would not forbid
disclosure merely because the data contained opinions and not
facts.
The courts have, with some consistency, given wider latitude
to administrative agencies-and to the IRS in particular-than to
parties in civil litigation.24 1 To sustain the contention that account-
ants' opinions are not summonable, however, would violate this
rule and restrict the IRS to a narrower scope of inquiry than that
available to civil litigants. Moreover, the opinion of an accountant
may itself be construed as a "fact" for purposes of proving fraudu-
lent intent. This interpretation is consistent with the policy of
reading the summons power-and, therefore, the phrase "other
data"-broadly. Certainly the power should be at least as liberally
construed as it is in the civil litigation context.
235. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are discussed only by way of analogy. Rule
81(a)(3), however, does provide that the civil rules generally are applicable to summons en-
forcement cases, even though the Supreme Court in Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S.
517 (1971), indicated that they may be modified or suspended to accomplish the aim of
summary adjudication. Id. at 528-29.




240. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).




Despite the Government's record of success in litigating sum-
monses for sensitive accountants' papers, the debate is still in its
developing stages. Disputes between the IRS and accountants and
their clients are virtually certain to continue, and thus it is impor-
tant to anticipate and analyze some of the likely future trends in
the area. These trends can be loosely grouped into two areas. First,
litigation over the policy, relevance, and "other data" issues will in
all likelihood continue. Second, accountants and their clients prob-
ably will attempt through other channels to restrain the IRS from
obtaining sensitive accountants' papers.
A. Continued Litigation
The relevance and policy arguments will in all likelihood con-
tinue to be litigated until the' decisions in the Supreme Court and
the lower courts coalesce into an unassailable and definitive rule.
These arguments undoubtedly will be refined in each succeeding
case as the precedents become clearer. Eventually, accountants
may be forced to take the position that while the IRS is entitled to
the facts recited in tax reserve data and reports to management, it
is not entitled to the accompanying opinions, speculations, or con-
clusions. The facts would, of course, be of considerable utility to
the IRS agent, but it is unlikely that these alone would satisfy him.
As noted above, the accountant's reasoning, opinions, speculations,
and conclusions are both directly and indirectly relevant,242 since
they effectively achieve the utility of an expert's opinion.2 4
Furthermore, the Service is unlikely to be willing to leave to
the taxpayer or accountants-or to the court for an in camera ex-
amination 2"-the judgment about what is fact and what is opin-
ion. The Service guards closely its prerogative to conduct indepen-
dent audits and decide for itself what is relevant, and judicial
precedent appears to support this prerogative.2 45 It is likely, there-
242. See notes 48-103 supra and accompanying text.
243. See notes 235-41 supra and accompanying text.
244. The courts in NoaU and Riley specifically disapproved of these in camera exami-
nations. But see United States v. First Chicago Corp., 43 A.F.T.R.2d 79-704 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
(mem.).
245. See, e.g., Beatty v. United States, 227 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1955); United States v.
Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Commissioner v. Backer, 178 F. Supp. 256 (M.D.
Ga. 1959), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960); Application
of Carroll, 149 F. Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom., Application of United States (Car-
roll), 246 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 847 (1957).
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fore, that litigation over these two arguments will continue to com-
mand the attention of the courts until all variations have been ex-
plored; but there is no reason to expect that the present pattern of
decisions will be altered. Since the position that tax reserve data
are not "other data" has so far been litigated only once,246 it will
most probably be tested again. Considering the argument's techni-
cal rationale and narrow interpretation of "other data," however,
the success of this argument is doubtful at best.
B. Other Efforts
The accounting profession undoubtedly will make-indeed, al-
ready has made-efforts through channels other than litigation to
deter the IRS from wielding its summons power to obtain tax re-
serve data and reports to management.24 7 The Internal Revenue
Audit Manual contains a self-imposed restriction on agents' access
to tax reserve data.2 48 According to the manual, this data is not to
be requested as a matter of standard examining procedure, but
only when the workpapers are believed to be material and relevant
to the examination. The manual reminds the examiner that the
taxpayer's records are the primary source of information, and that
tax reserve data and reports to management are only collateral
sources. The agent should "exhaust all reasonable means" to se-
cure the data from the taxpayer before pursuing the independent
auditor, which potentially includes a summons to the taxpayer's
financial officer or tax manager. While these restrictions are not an
outgrowth of the case law,249 they nevertheless control and curtail
the frequency and timing of requests for tax reserve data, and the
246. See note 219 supra and accompanying text.
247. See Caplin, supra note 36. Caplin describes a May 20, 1980, meeting of the Jus-
tice Department Advisory Committee on Tax Litigation in which the Assistant Attorney
General (Tax Division) endorsed the principle of restraint in seeking enforcement of sum-
monses for tax pool data. BNA Daily Tax Report May 21, 1980, at G-7, J-10. See also note
49 supra.
248. I INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL-AUDIT (CCH) § 4024 (August 1981).
249. The courts do not purport to make or evaluate policy but only to consider
whether the summons is enforceable under the Powell standards. See, e.g., United States v.
Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979). Even a viola-
tion of the Internal Revenue Audit Manual or Information Release 80-7, see note 49 supra,
in the issuance of a summons, however, would be unlikely to render the summons unen-
forceable for this reason alone. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); United
States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. IM. 1981) (mem.); cf. United
States v. Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417, 421 (10th Cir. 1971) (unpublished provision did not "exist
for the protection of the taxpayer's interests and rights"; agent's violation of investigation
guidelines could not inure to benefit of taxpayer).
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accounting profession is certain to attempt to emphasize and em-
ploy them. In addition, the profession may lobby for the passage of
some federal legislation. The intense interest of the professional
associations, indicated by their formation of advisory committees
on the topic, will enable the accountants to concentrate their ef-
forts on this point.
The accounting profession also might seek to protect their pa-
pers under the umbrella of the attorney-client privilege in one of
three ways: (1) By having the lawyer perform the accountant's
task; (2) by the laywer's vitiating the accountant's independence;
or (3) by each independent professional's using the other as a spe-
cialist. The first approach undoubtedly will encounter some resis-
tance from the legal profession, since most lawyers are not profes-
sional accountants and would be loathe to trust themselves to so
complex a task. Accountants' liability exposure also looms for law-
yers who hold themselves out to be accountants. Moreover, the
rules and laws that originally require the accounting services pro-
vide that an independent certified public accountant must perform
the work. 50
If the lawyer himself is a Certified Public Accountant (CPA),
or if he hires a CPA, past experience suggests that the attorney-
client privilege will not apply to the final work product; it has usu-
ally proved difficult to hire the lawyer's privilege. The mere trans-
fer of accounting records to an attorney, for example, does not
change their vulnerability to summons.15a The rationale underlying
this result is that the transfer does not satisfy the elements of the
attorney-client privilege,252 and the rights of the parties are fixed
250. The accountant must be independent of the client in the professional sense, ac-
cording to SEC rules. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(b) (1981). The attorney is by
* training and contract the agent and advocate of his principal; he is engaged not to be inde-
pendent. Moreover, the attorney's ethical canons require that he take his client's side vigor-
ously. Compare ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSMILrry Canon 5 with Canons 7 & 9.
251. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d
451 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. De Castro, West & Chodorow, Inc., 35 A.F.T.R. 2d 75-
1161 (C.D. Cal. 1975); United States v. Peden, 26 A.F.T.R. 2d 70-5342 (W.D. Ky. 1970).
252. Courts have articulated the attorney-client privilege in a variety of ways. Judge
Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950), made perhaps the most famous formulation on the subject when he stated,
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to
become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member
of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication
is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of
securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in
some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and
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as of the time the summons is issued. 53
The second approach contemplates the lawyer overcoming the
normal presumption of an accountant's independence by making
the accountant his "creature." Such a relationship has successfully
withstood a challenge from the IRS in one reported case,254 in
which the taxpayer's lawyers hired the accountant pursuant to an
employment agreement after the establishment of the attorney-cli-
ent relationship. The taxpayers expressly were named as clients of
the lawyers rather than the accountants, and the accounting ser-
vices were shown to facilitate accurate and complete legal consulta-
tion. All records-even if the accountant prepared them-became
the exclusive property of the law firm, which generated all billings.
In addition, all information was to be kept confidential. Short of
these extraordinary measures, however, a mere working relation-
ship between lawyer and accountant would not bring the latter
within the lawyer's privilege.2 55 Since accounting records for the
most part predate the creation of the attorney-client relationship,
the privilege usually will have no application.2 56 Tax reserve data
and reports to management, which the client desires from the ac-
countant for reasons other than exclusively legal advice, clearly fall
into this category of accounting records.
Moreover, under this approach, only the legal advice would be
protected, and then only when the lawyer generated it. The ac-
countant's duty to judge the adequacy of the tax reserve clearly
includes making a decision whether the components of that reserve
are legally as well as actuarially sound. He must point out ques-
tionable positions and demonstrate or satisfy himself about the le-
gal sufficiency of the accounting positions taken. Although legal
(4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
The transfer of records to an attorney presupposes either the existence of the records prior
to the creation of the attorney-client relationship or the creation of the records with the
intention that they will be disclosed to a person outside the privileged circle.
253. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 n.9 (1973).
254. United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973), modifying, 343 F.
Supp. 444 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
255. See also United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1972). In Cote the privilege
was sustained for an accountant's work memoranda that was used to prepare amended tax
returns when (1) the lawyer retained the accountant to audit the taxpayer's books and
records, (2) the accountant worked on the project only in the lawyer's office, and (3) based
on the audit, the lawyer advised the clients to file amended tax returns.. The extension of
Cote to cover tax reserve data and reports to management would be questionable for the
same reasons discussed in the accompanying text. See also Bauer v. Orser, 258 F. Supp. 338
(D.N.D. 1966).
256. See United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1973).
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advice is rendered, the advice emanates from a nonlawyer and,
therefore, would not be privileged.257 Indeed, to bring some portion
of the tax reserve data within the attorney-client privilege may re-
quire alterations in the normal division of labor that the parties
would not undertake willingly. The actuarial accounting calcula-
tions and accounting judgments, for example, would have to be
separated from the analysis of their legal results, so that the latter
could be consigned to an attorney. Neither clients nor their ac-
countants are likely to be professionally comfortable with abdica-
tion of the legal aspects of the accountant's role. Moreover, consid-
erations of professional responsibility may well preclude it. 258 From
the client's perspective-assuming that all other elements of the
privilege are satisfied-the gain is to shield only the legal advice
from the IRS. Important considerations such as the underlying
facts, the actuarial sifting, the communications between account-
ant and client and between accountant and lawyer, the accounting
advice and analysis, and the conclusions about the client's adher-
ence to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles-anything in
which nonlegal and legal advice are inextricably mixed-all would
likely be outside the privilege. It is doubtful that clients, or their
lawyers, 9 would conclude that the gain would be worth the price.
The third approach for an accountant who desires to be pro-
tected against production of sensitive papers is to use the lawyer,
or to have the lawyer use him, as a specialist. Under this approach,
an accountant must be necessary-or at least highly useful-for
the effective consultation between client and lawyer that the attor-
ney-client privilege is designed to permit.2 0 Thus, if the lawyer di-
257. United States v. Heiberger, 37 A.F.T.R.2d 76-1281 (D. Conn. 1976); cf. United
States v. De Castro, West & Chodorow, Inc., 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1161 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (client's
transfer of accountant's records to attorney demonstrated privacy expectation; attorney-cli-
ent privilege operated to protect records from summons). But see United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
258. In any event, the courts probably would not sanction such an abdication. See
Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953) (taxpayers' and accountants' records
in attorney's hands cannot be privileged; otherwise the transfer of records to an attorney
could defeat the administration of justice). But see United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918,
920-22 (2d Cir. 1961) (applicability of privilege depends on the extent to which the account-
ant's role is indispensible to the lawyer's function).
259. One recent article indicates that a national conference of lawyers and CPAs are
preparing a statement on this possibility. Legal Times of Washington, Nov. 17, 1980, at 1,
col. 1. The article suggests that the attorneys neither want the attendant liability exposure
nor have the accounting expertise.
260. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 513 (2d Cir. 1979) (accountants'
workpapers reflecting oral conversations with corporate employees could qualify as attorney
work product); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Arthur
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rects the client to tell his story first to the accountant whom the
lawyer has engaged, and the accountant then interprets the story
so that the lawyer can give better legal advice, the communications
to the accountant may be privileged. The test, however, is still
whether the communication is made in confidence for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice. If only accounting advice is sought, or if
the advice sought is the accountant's rather than the lawyer's, then
the privilege will not apply.2 61 Tax reserve data and reports to
management consist exclusively of accounting data that is
researched, compiled, and analyzed by accountants whose duty re-
quires independence from both the client and, presumably, his
agent, the lawyer. The data, except for raw data, originate with the
accountant and remain with him. Some legal analysis undoubtedly
is a part of the data-the analysis of the doubtfulness of a client's
position before the IRS on a topic, for example-but that advice
may constitute only the normal legal advice that accountants ex-
pect to give their clients. Alternatively, the accountants might try
to rely more heavily on the opinions of other experts such as law-
yers about the adequacy of the tax reserve. 62 Although the ac-
counting guidelines specifically sanction reliance on the opinion of
an expert,6 3 use of a specialist is confined to matters such as valu-
ation, physical characteristics, actuarial determinations, and inter-
pretation of technical requirements, regulations, or agreements.
This standard does not appear to contemplate obtaining and rely-
ing on the opinion of a lawyer as an expert on the adequacy of the
tax reserve. In any event, an expert in accounting would be un-
likely to rely on a nonaccountant for an expert opinion in his own
field. Thus, accountants will only rarely-if at all-be able to pro-
tect their workpapers by invoking the attorney-client privilege
through an adherence to its elements.
The final avenue that the accounting profession might pursue
is to tailor the accounting process in a way that either will restrict
the flow of data to accountants or circumscribe the data that they
retain to support their final opinion. Each of these approaches,
Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (work of accountants under aegis of attor-
neys held to be protected).
261. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1979); accord, United
States v. Schoeberlein, 335 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Md. 1971). But see United States v. Schmidt,
360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973), modifying, 343 F. Supp. 444 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
262. See Cohen, supra note 37, at 35; Holloran & Krongard, The Client-Accountant
Relationship, in IRS AcCESS TO AccouNTrrs' WORKPAPERS 151 (N.Y.L.J. Law Journal
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however, has significant drawbacks. The client's refusal to provide
adequate data may well result in either the accountant's having to
qualify his opinion or his declining to give one at all. The account-
ant must have sufficient, competent information from the client
and the client's resources to form a reasonable opinion s.2  Any_
thing less may not be acceptable to the SEC or to the corporation's
shareholders.
The failure to retain data by destroying all that is not deemed
material to or supportive of the final report potentially exposes the
accountant to an obstruction of justice charge. 65 Moreover, GAAS
may require the preservation of these workpapers, 266 and, in any
event, the workpapers enable the accountants to understand other
audited transactions. In addition, should the IRS also request and
obtain the audit workplan,6 7 it will be able to determine what ar-
eas are the most sensitive; if the underlying papers no longer exist,
the agent will immediately become suspicious. Finally, the follow-
ing years' audits may well require resort to prior years' records,
and, of course, the accountants ultimately must guard against ex-
posure to personal liability.
V. CONCLUSION
The choice may well be one of undesirable alternatives for the
accounting profession and its clients. After the accountants' initial
success in Coopers & Lybrand, the litigated cases have, with rare
exceptions, resulted in full enforcement of summonses for tax re-
serve data and reports to management. Indeed, one might wonder
why the profession has litigated so vigorously on the theory that
the data are "irrelevant." Common sense suggests that data which
the profession acknowledges is tax-related, and which highlights
questionable tax positions, would be highly useful to the IRS.
Therefore, the courts are not likely to entertain arguments for long
about the irrelevance of tax reserve data and reports to
management.
Nor are they likely to give great credence to the proposition
that a balancing test should be established. If such a test were to
be formulated, however, it would almost surely favor the IRS in
the great majority of cases. Likewise, the courts should reject the
264. AICPA STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 11, §§ 330, 510-514, 541.
265. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1510 (1976).
266. See AICPA STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 1, § 338.08.
267. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text.
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various interpretations of section 7602 that would impose a "con-
venience" standard on the IRS or narrowly construe the phrase
"other data." Finally, attempts to bring what are essentially ac-
counting workpapers under the protection of the attorney-client
privilege should not prevail.
The best hope for the accounting profession may well lie in
lobbying efforts, or in encouraging the IRS and the Department of
Justice to establish self-imposed restraints. Another alternative
might be for accountants to flag controversial or potentially ques-
tionable items on the return itself. 68 This idea, however, obviously
has not met with the overwhelming acceptance of those who would
be called upon to make the disclosures. On the other hand, if cor-
porations succeed in making the audit process truly a "game of
hare and hounds, 2 89 universal, mandatory reporting requirements
might well result, which undoubtedly would cause corporations se-
rious concern.
Beyond these options, relief appears unlikely. Accountants
and their clients may simply have to live with the not so outra-
geous notion that the weaknesses in a corporation's tax positions,
which its own auditors may have highlighted, will be exposed, and
that materials whose creation stems from an element of volunta-
rism may be used for other purposes. This disclosure is not an un-
desirable result when no recognizable rights of either the account-
ants or their clients are violated.
268. See Kurtz, Discussion on "Questionable Positions," 32 TAx LAW. 13 (1978).
269. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
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